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A. General discussion on the role of judicial scrutiny and discretion1 
 
Mainstream law and economics perceives judicial review as having primarily an error-
correction function2. Judicial review may also play additional roles, such as to guarantee 
procedural fairness through the protection of the rights of the parties, to ensure 
accountability with the promotion of deliberative and administrative processes or to ensure 
consistency, from a legal perspective, in the action of the reviewed authority, or finally to 
protect substantive fundamental rights, such as private property or the freedom of 
commerce3. At the same time, judicial review may impose costs on the regulators, the 
undertakings and the wider economy and may affect the effectiveness of the action of 
competition authorities. An intensive judicial scrutiny of the action of the authorities may 
discourage competition authorities from taking action, when this may be judged 
controversial, because of the fear of being overturned by the courts. Hence, the 
effectiveness of competition law enforcement may be negatively affected, in particular 
general deterrence. Furthermore, the principle of the separation of powers may lead courts 
to impose some self-restraint on the intensity of their scrutiny of competition authorities’ 
decisions in some circumstances.  
 
When the implementation of competition policy is entrusted to an independent 
administrative authority (administrative enforcement system), such as an integrated 
competition law agency exercising the functions of case selection, investigation, 
examination and adoption of the final decision, the courts exercise a merely “supervisory” 
jurisdiction, as they are concerned by the legality of the authority’s action, rather than its 
opportunity and merits. Even when the implementation of competition policy is entrusted 
to competition authorities and courts exercising a trial jurisdiction, the authorities bringing 
cases at first instance in front of specialised tribunals (a prosecutorial system), it is possible 
to argue that courts holding appellate jurisdiction (e.g. Supreme Courts) should exercise 
some self-restraint, in view of the fact that the law has been implemented directly by a 
specialised court. It is expected that a generalist court should recognize the limits of its own 
expertise and defer, in certain matters, to the view of the specialised tribunal (in a 
prosecutorial system), or that of a competition authority (in the presence of an 
administrative enforcement system). In view of their specialised expertise, specialised 
tribunals and competition authorities may be treated alike, with regard to their relation to a 
                                                          
1 We do not include a separate bibliography for this report. For bibliographical references, please consult the 
bibliography included in the report Lianos, I., Jenny, F., Wagner von Papp, F., Motchenkova E., David, E. 
et al (2014) An Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System for Infringements of Competition Law: a 
Comparative Analysis (CLES Research paper series 3/2014, UCL Faculty of Laws: London). 
2 See Shavell, S. (1995) “The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction” Journal of Legal Studies 24, 
379. 
3 Andreangeli, A. (2012) “Competition law and human rights: striking a balance between business freedom and 
regulatory intervention” in Lianos, I. and Sokol, D. (eds) The Global Limits of Competition Law , Stanford 
University Press, 22-36. 
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generalist court exercising an appellate function. In addition, in the context of an 
administrative enforcement system, one may advance the argument that policymaking 
should not be delegated in the hands of politically unaccountable judges but remain in the 
hands of politically accountable agencies. The legal framework needs, therefore, to strike a 
careful balance between the need to ensure accountability and accuracy of the 
interventions of competition authorities, without inadvertently holding back their action 
and transforming the courts into competition authorities.  
 
It follows from the above that competition authorities (and by analogy specialised tribunals) 
should be given some form of discretion. Even if the reviewing court has superior 
competence on issues of law, there should still be some discretion given to the specialised 
court having trial jurisdiction and/or the competition authority with regard to questions of 
facts and policy. The term discretion defines the function of the agency and describes the 
role of the reviewing court. Charles Koch accounts for five different uses of the term 
discretion in administrative law: 
 
“The authority to make individualizing decisions in the application of general rules 
can be characterized as “individualizing discretion”. Freedom to fill in gaps in 
delegated authority in order to execute assigned administrative functions may be 
called “executing discretion”. The power to take action to further societal goals is 
“policymaking discretion”. If no review is permitted, the agency is exercising 
“unbridled discretion”. Finally, if the decision cannot by its very nature be reviewed, 
the agency is exercising “numinous discretion”4.  
These different degrees of discretion hint at different functions and forms of judicial review.  
The judicial scrutiny of competition law decisions may take various forms. One may 
distinguish according to the different standards of review, that is, the grounds on which the 
regulator’s decisions may be challenged before a judge.  
 
Judicial review focuses on the lawfulness of the action of the reviewed authority, based on 
specific grounds. They do not entail a rehearing of the case. There have traditionally been 
three grounds for judicial review5, which may overlap and eventually merge with each 
other6:  
 
 Illegality: when the administrative authority acted ultra vires in a manner which is 
inconsistent with the parameters imposed by a superior source of law, the decision 
                                                          
4 Koch,C.H, (1986)  “Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion” George Washington Law Review, 54 (4), 
469-511, 470. 
5 These principles were elaborated upon by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil 
Service [1985] AC 374, 410.   
6 See, Lord Irvine LC in Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143 at 152 E-F: “the various 
grounds for judicial review run together. The exercise of a power for an improper purpose may involve 
taking irrelevant considerations into account, or ignoring relevant considerations; and either may lead to an 
irrational result”. Yet, there is no need to prove irrationality in  
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was taken for improper purposes, when the authority impermissibly expands its 
discretion or takes into account unlawful considerations in its decision, 
 
 Irrationality/unreasonableness in the exercise of any discretion (a concept which 
can be interpreted in different ways)7, and  
 
 Procedural impropriety: when, for instance, the authority has not followed the right 
procedures, such as the requirement to give reasons, the right to be heard and the 
rule against biased decision-making.  
 
 
 The courts also accept that a breach of legitimate expectations constitutes a 
discrete ground for judicial review, when an individual has been given an expectation 
that the authority in charge has not fulfilled.  
 
These categories are nor exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. Although the process of judicial 
review and its emphasis on the legality of the authority’s action indicates that the court will 
not engage thoroughly with questions of fact and policy but will instead focus on issues of 
law, the boundaries between these three categories are often difficult to establish, with the 
result that their relation can be better explained as forming a continuum. This is the reason 
why a manifest error in the assessment of facts may constitute a ground for review, without 
the court being expected to conduct a full factual assessment.  
 
In contrast, a review on the merits (or often referred to as an appeal process) will examine 
all possible grounds of review, including a full factual assessment of the rationality and 
opportunity of the authority’s action. It involves a consideration of whether the decision of 
the authority was right. The court will attempt to go beyond the usual grounds of review in 
order to determine what the decision of the authority should have been, in view of its 
statutory duties. A decision may thus be found legal, following judicial review, if it was made 
according to the law, and it is not unreasonable or made with procedural impropriety, but 
nonetheless may be found wrong, after the careful examination of facts in the process of a 
review on the merits. However, courts will not engage with questions of policy, in view of 
                                                          
7 English courts tend to consider that an irrational or unreasonable decision must be "so outrageous in its 
defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the 
question to be decided could have arrived at it": Council of Civil Service Unions -v- Minister for the Civil 
Service [1985] AC 374. The CAT elaborated on the concept of irrationality in BAA v Competition 
Commission (No. 2) [2012] CAT 3 20(3) - 20(4), 20(08) (asking the Competition Authority to take 
reasonable steps to acquaint itself with the relevant information to enable it to answer each statutory 
question posed for it as well as to have a sufficient basis in light of the totality of the evidence available to it 
for making the assessments and in reaching the decisions it did. To the extent to which it is necessary to 
carry out investigations to achieve this objective, the CAT requires evaluative assessments to be made by 
the OFT, as to which it has a wide margin of appreciation as it does in relation to other assessments to be 
made by it. Finally, the CAT intervenes only if no reasonable competition authority could have been 
satisfied on the basis of the inquiries made. The CAT should examine the “whole” context of the decision 
and should not aim to “trawl through the long and detailed reports of the [Competition Authority] with a 
fine-tooth comb to identify arguable errors“). 
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the “executing” and “policymaking” discretion from which benefit competition authorities 
and the principle of separation of powers.  Executing discretion refers to the “freedom to fill 
in gaps in delegated authority in order to execute assigned administrative functions”, while 
“policy making discretion consists in “the power to take action to further societal goals”8. 
 
The intensity of review into the rationality of the authority’s action may also be variable. In 
the context of judicial review courts may engage in a limited intensity review by exploring if 
the authorities have gravely disregarded the limits of their discretion, also paying attention 
not to substitute their decision for that of the authorities (low intensity). Courts may also 
exercise a more intensive level of scrutiny of the rationality of the decision of the authority, 
again without substituting their decision for that of the authority. Yet, they may show 
particular self-restraint to engage with some of the most complex and expertise-demanding 
factual assessments of the authority, providing authorities some margin of appraisal in 
complex economic and technical issues (intermediary intensity). In such cases the 
competence to set the fine is not transferred from the authority to the court but remains 
with the authority, which is limited however in the options available to it, as it is not 
possible to choose the option declared illegal by the court. Courts may finally exercise a 
comprehensive review of the facts, which may lead them to substitute their own judgment 
for that of the authority (in the context of a review on the merits or “unlimited judicial 
review”), and/or provide to the authority a very limited margin of discretion with regard to 
the options available to it (high intensity judicial review). The differences between a 
“review on the merits” and “unlimited judicial review” are subtle but relate mostly to the 
allocation of the residual competence recognized in the area under examination. In the 
context of a review on the merits, the residual competence is transferred from the authority 
to the court, which may choose to reconsider the question de novo and substitute its 
judgment and discretion for that of the authority. In the context of an “unlimited judicial 
review”, there is no transfer of competence from the authority to the court. The authority 
keeps residual competence in the matter, even if the court may choose to substitute its 
judgment for that of the authority. The Court can only substitute its judgment to that of the 
authority only for the issues covered by the specific ground of review that has been found 
successful. 
 
One may also refer to the possibility of further appeals from the courts exercising a limited 
or unlimited judicial review function to a superior court (e.g. Supreme Court). Two options 
are generally open. Either the appeal (or “pourvoi en cassation”) will be on points of law 
only (for instance on grounds of lack of competence of the appellate court, a breach of 
procedure before it avertedly affecting the interests of the applicant, or the infringement of 
law), the superior court not being able to substitute its own assessment for that of the 
inferior reviewing or appellate court, or it will exceptionally cover errors of fact as well 
(appeal in revision or “pourvoi en revision”). Superior courts nevertheless traditionally have 
                                                          
8 Koch,C.H, (1986)  “Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion” George Washington Law Review, 54 (4), 
469-511, 470. 
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taken a limited view on their role in such “appeals”, and it is rare that judgments of inferior 
courts are overturned for errors of fact in the very exceptional circumstances an appeal in 
revision has been granted. 
 
Consequently, in all circumstances, courts may exercise some self-restraint in order to 
provide the authority and the trial courts with the necessary degree of “executing” and 
“policymaking discretion”, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers. 
Courts are not expected to become competition authorities. One may also advance a similar 
argument for self-restraint with regard to the relation between specialised tribunals 
exercising a trial jurisdiction and courts exercising some form of appellate jurisdiction, this 
time on the basis of the superior expertise of the specialised tribunal and the often limited 
role of the superior courts in reviewing the judgments of inferior courts (on points of law 
only and exceptionally for errors of fact).   
 
There are various standards of review on which the regulator’s decisions may be challenged 
before a judge, depending on the intensity of the judicial review and the object of judicial 
scrutiny (control of legality or review on the merits). Judicial scrutiny is often exercised on 
material error. Not all errors committed will result in overturning the decision. These may 
be of different sorts9: 
 
 Material error of law: the decision-maker proceeded to a wrong interpretation of 
the law or ignored a legal principle, or misapplied the legal framework to the facts in 
question (a wrong characterization of facts coming from a misinterpretation of 
existing legal categories). 
 
 Material error of fact: the decision-maker misinterpreted the facts in reaching a 
decision, that error being significant enough to have an impact on the ultimate 
decision so that it might have been different, if such error has not been committed. 
 
 Material procedural irregularity: the procedure by which the decision was reached 
was biased, or the process was unfair to the level that the decision-maker was not 
equipped with the material it would reasonably have obtained, had the proper 
procedures being followed. The procedural irregularity should be significant enough 
to have an impact on the ultimate decision so that it might have been different, if 
such error has not been committed. 
 
 Unreasonable exercise of discretion: the authority (or the trial court) has exercised 
its discretion in a way falling outside the band in which a reasonable decision-maker 
would act. This may relate to the assessment and weighing of evidence, performed 
contrary to common sense or established principles of logic. 
 
                                                          
9 The following presentation draws on HM Government (2013) “Streamlining Regulatory and Competition 
Appeals. Consultation on Options for Reform” (June 19, 2013), 29-30. 
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 Unreasonable evaluative judgments or predictions: “ ‘Judgment’ refers to 
circumstances where the regulator is engaged in an evaluative function, considering 
various factors, assessing the balance of advantages and disadvantages and then 
deciding what outcome would most appropriately meet the regulatory objectives”, 
for instance, including “a situation where a regulator is balancing their objectives or 
duties”10. “‘Prediction’ concerns circumstances where a regulator applies economic 
or other expert analysis to form a view on what will happen in the future, for 
example the effects of a particular price control on the market”11. It is generally 
accepted that “where a [decision-maker] has made a judgement or prediction, the 
appeal body should defer to the regulator’s expertise”. Hence, if the decision-maker 
focused on the relevant factors and followed the right logical procedures, having 
exercised its judgment in a proper manner, the court exercising an appellate 
jurisdiction should not overturn its decision. Predictions should be assessed as being 
reasonable at the time of the decision, and not at the time of the appeal, even if it 
appears that they were wrong, because of a significant lapse of time between the 
trial court’s or authority’s decision and the appeal. 
 
In the exercise of their discretion, authorities may dispose of various trade-off devices in 
setting the appropriate, to the specific circumstances, remedial action or sanctions. The 
judicial scrutiny exercised by the appellate court will vary, depending on the discretionary 
space (discretion and/or margin of appreciation) the courts give to the authority (or 
specialised tribunal). We can systematize the different options in the form of a continuum 
with three broad types of scrutiny, going from a wide discretionary space given to the 
authority to a narrower one. 
One may adopt a simple means-end rationality test, which will consider if the amount of 
penalties imposed would indeed be a rational means to a purported end (effective 
enforcement of competition law, including deterrence). This may amount to a simple 
suitability test, which would provide the decision-maker with a lot of discretion in adopting 
the requisite amount of penalty, but with the limitation that the amount of the penalty 
should be linked rationally with some limited ends (effective enforcement of competition 
law, including deterrence). Hence, the test involves a list of limited ends, defined according 
to the aims pursued by the legal framework in question, as it would make no sense to 
proceed to an analysis of means without having in mind the ends to which these means aim. 
Another possibility would be to assess the proportionality of the sanctions. This trade-off 
device would inquire whether the means (the level of penalty) are proportionate to the 
ends (effective enforcement of competition law, including deterrence). This exercise will 
involve in addition to considering if the means chosen are indeed a rational means to a 
purported end (step 1 of the test), some assessment of the possible excessive costs of the 
                                                          
10 HM Government (2013) “Streamlining Regulatory and Competition Appeals. Consultation on Options for 
Reform” (June 19, 2013) 30. 
11 HM Government (2013) “Streamlining Regulatory and Competition Appeals. Consultation on Options for 
Reform” (June 19, 2013) 30. 
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specific penalty in relation to its benefits (step 2), and whether the amount of penalty 
chosen is the least restrictive to the affected interests’ alternative available in order to 
achieve the purported regulatory ends (step 3). The last operation inquires whether there is 
a less restrictive (to the affected interests), reasonably available alternative to accomplish 
the same remedial end (effective enforcement and deterrence). This test will not amount to 
a cost benefit analysis, as the test does not necessarily require that the benefits be more 
important than the costs; the costs may be more than the benefits but the decision-maker 
maintains some margin of appreciation to accept non disproportional differences between 
costs and benefits in the case. 
Finally, we can categorise under the broad category of cost benefit analysis, which is a 
balancing test that attempts to measure the costs and benefits of a remedial option or of 
alternative remedial options, before choosing the most appropriate test. This trade-off 
device requires of course a more intensive fact and evidence-gathering exercise by the 
decision-maker (at first instance or when exercising an appellate jurisdiction), and the 
consideration of the values of the costs and benefits examined. The type of the trade-off 
device required depends on the capacity of the institutions in each jurisdiction to carry the 
necessary assessment. One would expect a different capacity in a competition authority or a 
specialised expert tribunal than in a generalist court. The control exercised by the appellate 
jurisdiction may thus be either a rationality test, or a proportionality test, or finally a cost 
benefit analysis test, the latter test restricting significantly the discretion of the competition 
authority and raising important issues of comparative institutional analysis with regard to 
the available expertise in each institution. 
 
Having in mind these principles, we will examine the practice of judicial scrutiny of fines in 
Chile, before exploring the balance between effectiveness of competition policy and the 
protection of rights reached by other key jurisdictions. 
 
B. Judicial scrutiny of fines in Chile 
 
1. General data 
 
The final judgments of the specialised Competition Tribunal (TDLC) can be challenged before 
the Supreme Court. The remedy is called “recurso de reclamación”, which constitutes a sui 
generis procedure introduced for the implementation of Chilean Competition Law. This 
procedure allows the Supreme Court to review all legal and factual issues involved and may 
be compared to an appeal in revision. In some instances, the Supreme Court has proceeded 
to a full review of the TDLC’s determinations. 
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Since the establishment of the Competition Tribunal (in 2004), the Supreme Court has ruled 
32 times on TDLC’s judgments, on the basis of which fines were imposed12. In 16 cases the 
Supreme Court upheld the TDLC´s decision (fines remained unchanged). In 5 cases the 
Supreme Court eliminated the fine (primarily in the cases where the anticompetitive 
conduct was not properly accredited). In 3 cases the Supreme Court has increased the fines 
imposed by the TDLC (considering the total amount). Finally, the following analysis focuses 
on the remaining 7 cases, where the Supreme Court reduced the fines imposed by the TDLC. 
 
 
It is noteworthy that the analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court when reviewing other 
administrative fines is different than the one undertaken when examining fines imposed in 
the enforcement of competition law.  
For instance, fines imposed by the Electricity and Fuels Commission may be challenged 
before the generalist Appeal Court of the concerned jurisdiction on issues of law and fact. 
The judgment may be challenged before the Supreme Court but only regarding some limited 
issues (“recurso de casación en la forma y recurso de casación en el fondo”). The role of the 
Supreme Court in these cases is limited to the review of material procedural errors or 
material errors of law. The Supreme Court will approve or disapprove the imposed fine but 
will not be able to reduce it or increase it (thus substituting its judgment to that of the 
appellate court).  
Similarly, fines imposed by the Securities and Insurance Commission may be challenged 
before ordinary generalist civil courts and later appealed before the relevant Appeals 
Courts. They may finally be challenged in front of the Supreme Court, which is limited to the 
review of material procedural errors or material errors of law (“recurso de casación en la 
forma y recurso de casación en el fondo”). Again, the Supreme Court will proceed to a 
limited review of these fines.  
                                                          
12 It is important to emphasise that this does not reflect the total number of cases in which the TDLC has 
imposed fines.  
17, 53%
3, 9%
7, 22%
5, 16%12, 38%
Figure 1 : Change of fines imposed by the TDLC considering Supreme Court reviews: No 
changes (remains equal), decrease, increase                                                                                  
(N° cases; %) 
Fines remains equal
Fines (total amount) increase
Fines (total amount) decrease
Fines (total amount) reduced
to 0 (judgement reversed)
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There are different factors explaining this difference of approach. First, different types of 
judicial scrutiny apply in each case. In the context of competition law, the Supreme Court 
exercises an appellate jurisdiction in revision, examining points of law and fact, while in the 
context of utilities (energy) and securities’ regulation the Supreme Court exercises a limited 
jurisdiction on points of law only ( “pourvoi en cassation”). Second, in the context of 
competition law the Supreme Court reviews the judgment of a specialised tribunal 
exercising a trial jurisdiction and benefiting from an extensive expertise on matters of law 
and economics (and the underlying policy choices), while in the context of utilities (energy) 
and securities regulation, the Supreme Court reviews the judgments of ordinary generalist 
appellate courts. Hence, one may argue that the Supreme Court should proceed equally 
carefully in all these instances and recognize the limits of its own expertise on policy, when 
reviewing. 
It is true that fines imposed in the context of competition law infringements are generally of 
a higher level than that imposed in the context of utilities (energy) and securities regulation, 
as this is often the case in other jurisdictions. Although it has been impossible to locate a 
database with the imposed fines in the context of utilities (energy) and securities regulation, 
or information about the filed remedies in front of the Civil Courts and the Appeals Courts 
or the Supreme Court’s judgments, for comparison purposes, we have included some recent 
cases regarding fines imposed by the Electricity and Fuels Commission and the Securities 
and Insurance Commission. These fines have generally been confirmed by the Supreme 
Court. 
 
Table 11: Judicial Scrutiny of Regulatory Fines in Chile 
Electricity and Fuels Commission (SEC) 
Case/company Fine imposed by 
SEC 
Appeal Court Supreme Court 
OSRAM. Fine imposed 
for not providing 
required information. 
 
UTA 200 Confirmed Confirmed 
January 2014 
OSRAM. Fine imposed 
for not certifying 
electric products.  
 
UTA 140 plus trial 
expenses 
Confirmed Confirmed 
January 2014 
Many electric 
companies responsible 
for a 2010  blackout. 
 
UTA 6,300 in total 
plus compensation 
for consumers. 
Different companies 
appealed separately. 
Some succeeded, 
others not.  
Confirmed all fines 
originally imposed 
by the SEC. 
November 2013 
Transelec. Fine 
imposed for infringing 
the supply contract 
UTA 2,000 Confirmed Confirmed 
March 2013 
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Gas company Lipigas 
for not certifying a gas 
installation of a 
building that caused 
an accident. 
UTA 200 Overturned (annulled 
fine) 
Confirmed fine 
May 2012 
Many electric 
companies involved in 
blackout considered 
responsible for a 2004 
blackout 
UTA 6,460 Confirmed Confirmed 
August 2011 
Many electric 
companies considered 
responsible for a 2002 
blackout 
UTA 13,750 in total Confirmed Confirmed 
March 2011 
 
Securities and Insurance Commission  (SVS) 
Case/company Fine imposed by 
SEC 
Appeal Court Supreme Court 
María Luisa Solari and 
Marcel Zarour. Fine 
imposed for the use of 
privileged information 
UF 1,000 and UF 
2,725 
Confirmed Confirmed 
December 2013 
CEO’s of pension funds 
administrator for the use 
of privileged information. 
UF 350 Confirmed Overturned 
(annulled fine) 
November 2013 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
For breaching duties of 
care of an external audit 
firm. 
UF 8,000 Confirmed Confirmed 
November 2013 
Pablo Alcalde. Fine for 
modifying the financial 
statements of a company.  
UF 25,000 Confirmed Confirmed 
October 2013 
Juan Cueto. For use of 
privileged information. 
UF 1,620 Confirmed Confirmed 
November 2012 
Banchile stockbrokers. 
For use of “forward 
contracts”.  
UF 300 Overturned (annulled 
fine) 
Confirmed fine 
October 2011 
[Information obtained from the press] 
Yet the relative low amount of these fines may be explained from the availability of other 
types of sanctions (criminal) and the deterrent effect of private litigation for damages, 
which are not available to the same extent in the context of competition law enforcement. 
Similarly, competition law litigation always produces polycentric effects, in the sense that 
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large categories of consumers or market actors (at the national level) are affected by 
competition law infringements and the impact on the overall economy may be particularly 
high. This is rarely the case for the type of infringements found in energy and securities 
regulation, which explains the need to factor into the setting of fines in the area of 
competition law considerations of specific and general deterrence. General deterrence may 
be affected by the existence of a legal maximum threshold for fines in the context of 
competition law, as it is possible for undertakings to adopt strategies maximizing the 
benefits of competition law infringements, in view of the limited fines they pay for it as a 
result of the maximum fines threshold. Last but not least, competition law infringements are 
not easily observable, in particular if these take the form of secret cartels, with the result 
that the probability of detection of competition law infringements is on average much lower 
than that of other types of infringement, for instance in utilities or securities regulation, 
where firms are subject to intensive regulatory scrutiny and frequent monitoring of their 
activity and accounts by regulators. Hence, if according to the formula for optimal 
enforcement we introduced in the first part of this report, an optimal sanction should 
depend on the harm inflicted by the infringement and its probability of detection, the low 
probability of detection of competition law infringements and the significant harm that they 
inflict on consumers and the economy overall should justify a much higher level of penalties. 
 
2. Case Studies 
 
We proceed to the analysis of the most important cases of the Supreme Court examining 
the fines imposed by the Competition Tribunal. Cases in which Supreme Court has reduced 
the fines imposed by the TDLC are the following:  
 
1. 
CONSTRUCTORA E 
INMOBILIARIA 
INDEPENDENCIA LTDA. 
(COMPLAINT) vs.  AGUAS 
NUEVO SUR MAULE S.A. 
et al. 
DECISION 85 
Abuse 
of              
domina
nce 
Construct
ion 
  
Reduced  
(-47%) 
 
In 2005, a private construction company and the FNE filed complaints against a sanitary 
services provider (Aguas Nuevo Sur). It was argued by the construction company that the 
defendant charged arbitrary and discriminatory prices for its services for real estate projects 
in the rural areas of certain regions of Chile.  
The FNE extended the complaint to other three sanitary services providers (ESSAL, ESSBIO 
and Aguas Andinas). The FNE argued that between 2003 and 2005 the companies made 
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abusive requirements and charges for their sanitary services (clean water and sewer system) 
for users in urban and rural areas near to the their respective concession areas and that 
they had misused a reimbursable financing contribution system that was established in 
order to finance the expansion of the provision of sanitary services, to new real estate 
projects and developments, in their concession areas.  
 
The FNE13 required a fine of 65.000 UTM (5,400 UTA) for ESSBIO, 44.000 UTM (3,600 UTA) 
for Aguas Nuevo Sur, 48.000 UTM (4,000 UTA) for ESSAL and 50.000 UTM (4,100 UTA) for 
Aguas Andinas. The amounts were established “mainly due to the economic profits 
obtained” by the companies. The FNE made some general calculations regarding how much 
additional charges they made to some construction companies, but does not explain how it 
got to the established number in detail.   
In July 2009 the TDLC issued a sentence14. For the purposes of determining the amount of 
the fine, the TDLC considered article 26.c DL No. 211 which states that the seriousness of 
the conduct, the economic benefit and previous offenses, must be taken into account.  
The TDLC found regarding the claim presented by the construction company, that Aguas 
Nuevo Sur had indeed charged abusive prices in some cases and imposed a fine of 1,338 
UTA based on the additional amounts charged.  
Regarding the claim presented by the FNE, the TDLC found that Aguas Nuevo Sur and 
ESSBIO had misused the existing state reimbursable financing contribution system. The TDLC 
determined that Aguas Nuevo Sur had perceived benefits of at least 44,000 UF (2,130 UTA) 
and ESSBIO at least 41,000 UF (2,000 UTA). These results were obtained after a detailed 
review of information provided by Sanitary Services Supervisor Authority.  
In addition, the TDLC found that the abusive behaviour was important.   
Therefore the TDLC imposed a fine for Aguas Nuevo Sur Maule of 1,254 UTA (in addition to 
the previous fine) and for ESSBIO SA fine of 2,341 UTA.  
The other undertakings were not sanctioned. Nevertheless, for all of them, the TDLC 
required some changes in the pricing politics and recommended changes in the regulation 
to the authorities.  
The fine was reduced by the Supreme Court among other reasons because the defendants 
have not been previously convicted for breaches of competition law. Those reasons made 
the Supreme Court conclude that the fines imposed by the TDLC were disproportionate.  
Paragraph 18: “[…] This Court agrees with the conclusions of the judgment 
under appeal and, accordingly, will reject the claim of Aguas Nuevo Sur 
Maule S.A. and ESSBIO S.A. and will confirm the judgment that considers 
unwarranted the charging of the item “new consumption” [by the 
                                                          
13 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento%20FNE.pdf 
14 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_85_2009.pdf  
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defendants]; however the Court considers that the amount of the fine set 
forth in the judgment are disproportionate to the conduct which is 
attributed to the two companies. In particular, the realization of type of 
letter c ) of Article 3 of Decree 211 [Competition Act] are based on a series 
of observations about the new consumption factor, that even when 
founded, do not demonstrate exactly the amounts that would benefit the 
water companies to the expense of construction. Moreover, as recognized 
by the ruling, Aguas Nuevo Sur Maule S.A. and ESSBIO S.A. have not been 
previously convicted for breaches of competition law and taking into 
account the request of both subsidiary undertakings for the purposes of 
requesting a reduction of fines, this Court will grant the request to the 
manner determined in the operative part of Decision”. 
 
2. 
FNE (COMPLAINT) and 
BANCO DE CHILE  vs.  
FALABELLA Y PARIS S.A. 
DECISION 63 
Collusion Retail      Reduced (-25%) 
 
In this case the fine is reduced by 25%, considering (i) the duration of the harmful event 
(duration of the anticompetitive behaviour); (ii) the economic benefit reported by the acts 
committed in that period (the context of the anticompetitive conduct was a technology 
trade fair, which lasted four days, in which LCD TV sets would be offered at special prices).  
Indirectly, the Court also considered that the fine requested by the FNE was lower than the 
fine imposed by the TDLC.  
Paragraph 34: “[...] Comparative review of the arguments contained in the 
complaint initiated by the National Economic Prosecutor's Office and the 
TDLC’s judgment evidence a similar analysis on the behaviour of the 
defendants. However, after weighing in the facts, they differ in the amount 
of the fines imposed: the amount recommended by the National Economic 
Prosecutor's Office is evidently lower than the fine imposed on TDLC’s 
judgment”. 
Paragraph 35: “Moreover, the limited duration of the punishable 
behaviour[] needs to be taken into consideration. Therefore, one of the 
factors that need to be borne in mind in determining the amount of the fine 
to be applied is the duration of the harmful event and its consequences 
over time. Indeed, the realization of the so-called "Technology IN Trade 
show of Banco de Chile" took place over four days (6 , 7, 8 and 9 April 
2006), a situation which rules out a persistent or continuous violation of 
competition [law].  
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Also, the amount of the fine should consider, among other things, the 
economic benefit accountable to the acts committed in that period. 
Therefore, it would be logical to consider a reasonable percentage that 
corresponds to the duration of the facts, unlike the TDLC’s judgment that in 
the final part of its reasoning [paragraph] 163°, argues that "the amount of 
the fine for each participant to the agreement, will be approximately 2% of 
the 2005 sales of home appliances, in which customers make use of the 
department stores’ own credit card as payment method”, reasoning that 
extends the profit reported during those four days to the annual income.  
Paragraph 36: “For those reasons, this Court accepts the alternative claim -
that both defendants have made- and will determine the amount of the 
fine in the operative part of this sentence”. 
 
3. 
FNE (COMPLAINT)  vs.  
AM PATAGONIA S.A et al.  
DECISION 74. 
Collusion Heatlh     Reduced (-90%) 
 
On 2006, the FNE presented a claim alleging collusion of 74 of the 84 physicians that worked 
in Punta Arenas (southern and isolated city of Chile). They had subscribed an agreement 
regarding the prices to be charged for services given by the different physicians and formed 
an association. The agreement had the effect of increasing the prices of the health services 
in Punta Arenas. The claim was presented on December 200615, and the FNE requested a 
fine of 100 UTA to the three physicians that were the instigators and 50 UTA for the rest of 
them. On September 200816 the TDLC issued a sentence absolving 10 physicians that did not 
(or could not due to the market conditions) raise the services prices; condemning the rest of 
them to a fine of 15 UTM (which is only 1,25 UTA) and the instigator, to 30 UTM (2,5 UTA). 
The fines were considerably lower than the ones required by the FNE. The TDLC reduced the 
fine because the undertakings took actions to reduce the effect of the illegal conduct once 
aware of it and the formed association had also many licit purposes. In a judgment, issued in 
December 200817, the Supreme Court reduced the fine by 90%, considering (i) the duration 
of the anticompetitive behaviour (May 2005 to May 2006) and (ii) the acts followed by the 
defendants in order to mitigate the anticompetitive effects of their agreement.   
The Supreme Court considered that the TDLC’s sentence did not contained sufficient 
reasoning to support their fining decision and that the fines had been applied without 
mentioning adequate motives, grounds and circumstances. Therefore, the TDLC would have 
failed to comply with the final paragraph of Article 26 Competition Act. The Court insisted 
that the development of such reasoning was necessary to achieve a fair trial.  
                                                          
15 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento_C_121_06.pdf 
16 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_74_2008.pdf 
17 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_74_Corte_Suprema.pdf 
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For these reasons the Supreme Court condemned each undertaking to the fine of 1,5 UTM 
(something like US 1,200). 
 
Paragraph 12: “[…] Finally, this Court will grant the defendants’ request, to 
substantially reduce the fine. To do this, this Court considers that first, the 
TDLC’s judgment does not contain sufficient reasoning to support their 
decision; so the application of fines has been built almost as a matter of 
discretion, without adequate motifs, grounds and circumstances for the 
parameters used for setting the amount of the fine, all of which impose a 
failure to comply with the final paragraph of Article 26 Competition Act. 
As this Court has held in previous decisions (Decision Rol No. 2339-08), the 
development of such reasoning is necessary to achieve a fair trial, 
understood both on its formal or adjective dimension as well as on its 
substantive or substantial extension, especially considering this is directly 
linked to the principle of reason and proportionality, to allow the parties to 
seek a proper and clear defense and offer adequate judicial remedies.  
Paragraph 13: “Also in this case the restricted temporal scope of the acts 
must be considered. Therefore, one of the factors that have to be borne in 
mind in determining the amount of the fine to be applied is the duration of 
the harmful event and its consequences over time, as held by this Court in 
judgment No. 2339-08. Indeed, the TDLC itself established the period of the 
infringement from May 2005 to May 2006 […], a situation that ruled out a 
persistent or continuous process in violation of free competition. Moreover, 
the decision highlights that, once appropriate measures are adopted by the 
defendants, Ampatagonia and the ways they operate does not pose a risk 
to free competition”.  
Paragraph 14: “[…], finally, special consideration must be given to the acts 
displayed by the defendants in order to mitigate the anticompetitive effects 
of the agreements, which also has been expressly recognized in the 
sentence by the Competition Tribunal in paragraph thirty-sixth”.  
Paragraph 15: “[…], for the reasons given, the Court, accepting the request 
of the defendant, will determine the fine in the amount that will be 
established in the operative part of the Decision”. 
 
4. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT  vs.  LA 
ASOCIACION GREMIAL DE 
BUSES INTERBUS et al. 
DECISION 82 
Collusion 
Transp
ort 
    Reduced (-50%) 
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In this case the fine was reduced by 50%, considering (i) the number of parties sued, (ii) the 
size of the market in which they operate, and (iii) the section of the bus routes involved in 
the collusion agreement.   
 
Paragraph 11: “[…] On the aggravating circumstances considered for the 
calculation of the fine, according to the forty-second paragraph of the 
TDLC’s judgment, we conclude that to date, Article 26 of the Competition 
Act does not apply, because as is asserted in the sixth paragraph of the 
same judgment, that provision defined as aggravating circumstances for the 
former criminal responsibility on violations of competition law, the fact that 
it was a trade association who breached the law. On this basis, as well as 
considering the number of member of the trade association, the size of the 
market in which they operate, the section of the route which ultimately 
generated the illicit agreement, allows the Court to reduce the amount of 
the fine imposed on the defendant. This does not [] in any way diminish the 
reproach against the conduct [] which justifies its sanction. 
For these reasons and for the provisions of Article 27 of the Competition 
Act, the Claim raised in the main of pages 492 against the judgment N ° 
82/2009 […] is welcomed only in what considers the decrease of the 
amount of the fine imposed on “Interbus Trade Association” to thirty (30) 
UTA18 […]”. 
 
5. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT vs.  
EMPRESA ELECTRICA DE 
MAGALLANES S.A. 
DECISION 73. 
Abuse of 
dominan
ce 
Electric
ity 
    Reduced (-25%) 
 
In this case the fine is reduced by 25%, considering (i) the duration of the harmful event and 
its consequences, and (ii) the scope of the agreement (the segment of customers affected).  
The Supreme Court also considered the fact that the defendant had no prior convictions for 
breaching competition law.  
                                                          
18 Unidad Tributaria Mensual (UTM) (literally: monthly tax unit) is a unit of account used in Chile to measure 
taxes, fines, etc. which is adjusted to inflation on a monthly basis. Unidad Tributaria Anual (UTA) 
(literally: annual tax unit) is the unit of account used in the Competition Act to regulate limits on fines, and 
is equal to 12 UTM (1 UTA = 12 UTM). On March 2014, 1 UTM = CLP $41.263 = USD $72,13 ($1 USD 
= $572 CLP on 03/17/2014), and  1 UTA = CLP $495.156 = USD $565,65. 
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Paragraph 18: “[…], to determine the fine, it is necessary to consider 
objective and subjective circumstances that constitute a punishable fact 
and its consequences. Therefore, one of several factors that will be taken 
into consideration in determining the amount of the fine to be applied is 
the duration of the harmful event and its consequences over time. Indeed, 
it is undisputed that the rise in rates occurred from January 2005; however, 
since January 2003 the defendant has failed to recover the special 
petroleum tax. In addition, the rise was maintained from January 2005 to 
November 2007 –the date of the Complaint– which led Edelmag to obtain 
higher profits than normal, only in what concerns retail customers, without 
affecting commercial/industrial customers or the Navy (high voltage 
customers, subject to AT2 rates) or street lighting, commercial clients and 
public institutions (low voltage customers, subject to BT2 rate). 
Paragraph 19: “[…] Considering what is stated in the previous paragraph, 
and also considering that Edelmag has not been the subject of no prior 
Complaints, this Court                              –accepting the alternative claim that 
the defendant has made– determines the fine in the amount that will be 
established in the operative part of this Decision”. 
 
 
6. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT vs. EL 
SR. JOHN C. MALONE. 
DECISION 117. 
Failure 
to 
comply a 
judgmen
t 
Teleco
mmuni
cations 
    Reduced (-100%) 
 
In this case the fine is eliminated, although the Supreme Court did not reversed the TDLC’s 
decision but for the establishment of a fine.  The main (and only reason) exposed by the 
Supreme Court to waive payment of the fine is the collaborative attitude of the defendant, 
which would indicate that his intention was not to infringe competition rules. 
 
Summary of the case 
In March 2008 the FNE filed a complaint against John Malone, controller of VTR, one of 
Chile’s telecommunication companies. VTR had merged with another telecommunications 
company in 2004. One of the conditions for allowing the merger was that VTR had to 
abstain itself from participating in the satellite TV market. Nevertheless, John Malone 
acquired indirectly part of DirecTV Chile, a satellite TV operator, infringing the condition 
imposed by the TDLC when approving the 2004 merger. The FNE was able to prove the 
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infringement of the conditions, and in December 2011, the TDLC issued a unanimous 
condemnatory sentence against John Malone.  
 
Fine requested by the FNE 
The FNE requested a fine of UTA 2.00019. The considerations that led the FNE to request this 
fine were as following:  
(i) The seriousness of the offence. In 2004 the TDLC authorized a merger that 
strongly increased the concentration in the relevant market. This fact imposed a 
special duty to VTR as the dominant firm in the cable television market.  
 
(ii) The 2004 conditions prohibited any kind of acquisitions in the satellite TV 
market, even small shares acquired indirectly. Nevertheless, John Malone 
acquired the control of DirecTV.  
 
(iii) The acquisition impedes the development of paid TV in Chile since VTR is the 
dominant company in the cable TV market and DirecTV was one of its 
competitors. 
  
(iv) The FNE warned John Malone of this infringement before the acquisition of 
DirecTV’s control was made. But the warning was ignored.  
 
Fine imposed by the TDLC 
The TDLC found that John Malone had breached the conditions established for the 2004 
merger. This justified imposing a measure and a penalty, both provided for in Article 26 of 
DL No.211. The first measure had the aim of obliging John Malone to sell its ownership in 
DirecTV Chile, within a short but reasonable time. For the purposes of determining the 
amount of the fine, the TDLC considered that the seriousness of the conduct, the economic 
benefit and previous offenses, must be taken into account20.  
The TDLC found that  there was ample evidence that Mr. Malone was the controller of VTR 
and because of this quality was aware of the conditions imposed in 2004 and that while 
remaining VTR controller and knowing the condition affecting VTR, he acquired and 
maintained until now shares of DirecTV Chile. Despite being warned of the wrongfulness of 
such conduct by the FNE when the investigation was initiated, he continued to infringe the 
conditions imposed. His conduct not only affected the legality of the 2004 merger but also 
generated adverse market effects. It enabled a company with a dominant position in the 
cable TV market to influence, through a common controller, its competitor, DirecTV. The 
                                                          
19 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento_FNE_C_156_08.pdf, 13. 
20  http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_117_2011.pdf, 41. 
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offence reported VTR important economic benefits since it strengthened VTR’s dominant 
position in the market. The offence was maintained for almost three years. The Tribunal, 
however, noted that Mr. Malone was not a repeated offender. Consequently, the TDLC 
imposed a fine of UTA 4,000.  
 
Fine reduced by the Supreme Court 
During the procedure, the Supreme Court proposed some guidelines for a conciliatory 
agreement to the parties (FNE and John Malone). The agreement was reached on April 
2013 and included provisions that ensured the compliance with the 2004 conditions. The 
agreement established in detail how and when Mr. Malone was going to sell its ownership 
in DirecTV. Also, Mr. Malone agreed to pay the FNE CLP 120 million (UTA 240/ USD 
230.000) in order to cover the litigation costs. On the other hand, the FNE, taking into 
consideration that the settlement ensured compliance with the 2004 conditions, withdrew 
its claim to maintain the UTA 4,000 fine imposed by the TDLC.   
The Final sentence was issued on June 201321. Considering the agreement and that the FNE 
declined to further pursue the payment of the fine, the Supreme Court decided to waive 
the fine imposed by the TDLC. The main reason expressed by the Supreme Court was the 
collaborative attitude of the defendant, which would indicate that he had no intention to 
infringe competition rules. As a starting point of the discussion, the Supreme Court 
commented on the function of fines in the enforcement of competition law in Chile: 
Paragraph 6: “[…] it is useful to state that in competition law, including 
Chile, the fine appears to be the main form of sanction. In the discussion of 
the objectives of the sanctions, among others, factors of retribution and 
deterrence are usually mentioned. The retributive functions seek[] for the 
offender to receive his just punishment for the crime committed, while 
deterrence is looking to deter, discourage and prevent both the offender 
and other persons from committing offenses”.  
The Supreme Court found that a consultation regarding an exchange of shares made by one 
of the companies of the VTR group demonstrated that John Malone had voluntarily tried to 
request an opinion of the TDLC before the FNE’s investigation. Therefore, it demonstrated 
that the defendant had no intent to engage in anti-competitive behaviour22. This argument 
of the defendant had been rejected by the TDLC since the company that made the 
consultation had no relation with John Malone at that time, and because the consultation 
was declared inadmissible and not even reviewed by the authorities.  Nevertheless, the 
Court stated that the fine applied to John C. Malone appeared unnecessary and did not 
meet its purpose, since in the Supreme Court’s view, the activities of the defendant, 
namely, the voluntary notification to the TDLC of the merger as well as agreeing to meet 
                                                          
21  http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_117_Corte_Suprema.pdf, 5. 
22 Supreme Court’s judgment, para 8. 
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the 2004 conditions, suggested a collaborative behaviour and a commitment to 
competition law23. 
 
 
7. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT  vs.  
TECUMSEH DO BRASIL 
LTDA. et al. DECISION 122 
Collusion 
Industri
al 
29-07-
2010 
29-06-
2012 
Reduced (-52%) 
 
In this case the fine is reduced 52%. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not make a 
thorough assessment of the criteria used to reduce the amount of the fine, relying primarily 
on prudential considerations. The Supreme Court argued that a lower fine also met the 
deterrence and retribution objectives of fines in competition law. 
 
Summary of the case 
In 2010, the FNE filed a complaint against Whirlpool S.A. and Tecumseh Do Brasil Ltda., the 
main providers of low power, hermetic compressors for the manufacturing of refrigerators, 
which have been participating in an international cartel since 2004. As a result of the cartel, 
prices increased more than 80% between 2004 and 2008. This also resulted in higher prices 
for refrigerators in the Chilean market (this input represents about 20% of the refrigerators’ 
total cost). Both companies were fined in a number of jurisdictions.  
The case is of particular interest for Chilean competition law, as it constitutes the first case 
in Chile in which the tribunal made use of the leniency program for the detection of cartels, 
hence representing a milestone in the history of cartel persecution in Chile. In particular, 
Tecumseh constitutes the first company that met the legal requirement to be exempted 
from any fines. The TDLC ruled unanimously against the two companies and fined Whirlpool 
for the sum of UTA 10,500 (approximately US$ 10 million) plus legal expenses. 
 
Fine requested by the FNE 
The FNE requested a fine of 15,000 UTA24. During the trial process, the FNE submitted to the 
TDLC an economic report that justified the amount of fine requested on the basis of the 
estimation of the excess gains obtained by the cartel25.  
                                                          
23 Supreme Court’s judgment, para 9. 
24 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento%20de%20la%20FNE%20contra%20Tecumseh% 
20Do%20Brasil%20Ltda.%20y%20otro.pdf 
25 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Informe%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20Paula%20Rold%C3%A1n% 
20y%20Francisco%20Caravia%20(FNE).pdf 
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The estimation of excess gains required the determination of the duration of the cartel as 
well as the overprice charged during the price-fixing period. Tecumseh fully collaborated 
with information and data, as opposed to Whirlpool, who delivered inexact and 
incomprehensive data, impossible for use in the analysis. As a result, the FNE relied 
exclusively on the Tecumseh data and used extrapolation to draw results on Whirlpool.  
 
The duration of the cartel was determined by qualitative information obtained by 
Tecumseh, according to which the cartel dated back to the beginning of 2004 and 
terminated around February of 2009.  
For the determination of a counterfactual, it was assumed that after the termination of the 
agreement the two firms returned gradually towards more competitive levels until 
December 2009, by which time the market had fully returned to competitive conditions. 
Excess gains were then estimated using the profit margin of December 2009 as a 
counterfactual.  The excess profits were then estimated as the real profits obtained by the 
two firms minus the profits that would have been obtained had margins been at the level of 
December 2009. The use of profit margins instead of prices for the estimation of the cartel’s 
profits addressed Whirlpool’s defence that associated the high prices during the period of 
collusion to the rising cost of essential inputs for the production of compressors, such as 
iron. Finally the cartel profits were calculated by adding the actual profits obtained by the 
two firms during the cartel, and then by subtracting the profits that it would have earned 
had margins been at the December 2009 level.    
Overall, it is estimated that margins were varying between 100% and 140%, during 
collusion, far in excess of the 33% observed in December 2009. According to the above, 
Tecumseh gained the sum of CLP 4.4 billion, or approximately USD 8.5 million.  
Excess profits for Whirlpool were estimated by means of proportionality using the average 
market share of Whirlpool for the period of 2004-2009, which was at 58%.  This brought 
excess profits at CLP 7.2 billion, or USD 14 million. The FNE then requested a fine equal to 
the excess gain obtained by the cartel, amounting to approximately UTA 15,000.  
 
Fine imposed by the TDLC 
The TDLC considered that the cartel and its effects were proven and sentenced Whirlpool to 
pay a fine of UTA 10,50026. The fine is lower than the one proposed by the FNE. Even if the 
TDLC used similar steps than the FNE to estimate Whirlpool’s cartel benefits, it made some 
changes in the formula that diminished the final amount. In the first place, the FNE 
considered as a profit margin benchmark Tecumseh’s margin of September 2009. The TDLC, 
on the other hand, considered Tecumseh’s average profit margin in the last four months of 
2009, which led to a higher benchmark. In addition, the TDLC considered that the collusive 
                                                          
26 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_122_2012.pdf, 56.  
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agreement had only started in January 2005 and not in 2004, as the FNE argued. Thus, with 
these modifications of the FNE’s calculations, the TDLC imposed a lower fine.   
 
Reduction of the fine by the Supreme Court 
Whirlpool brought the case before the Supreme Court27, which issued a judgement on 
September 2013. Among other things, Whirpoool claimed that the TDLC had no jurisdiction - 
because the cartel occurred outside of Chile - and that the infraction had already been 
punished (ne bis in idem principle). The Supreme Court rejected both arguments and added 
that “no foreign jurisdiction has considered or punished the events that occurred and had 
affected the domestic market.”  
Regarding the fine, the Court expressly stated that it agreed with the amount of the fine 
imposed by the TDLC, considering that TDLC’s calculation aimed to estimate the benefits 
that the agreement would have generated for Whirlpool SA, and that calculation was not 
marred by any significant error. Furthermore, the Court found that the fine adequately 
reflected the seriousness of the offense and that, in order to be effective, the penalty had to 
serve as a deterrent instrument.  Nevertheless, after that statement, the Court considered 
that the deterrence and retribution objectives of fines sought in competition law would also 
be achieved if the fine was “reasonably” reduced. According to the Court, 
Paragraph 30:  […] Notwithstanding the above and even if this Supreme 
Court agree[s] that the amount of the fine imposed by the TDLC shows the 
seriousness of the offense and the fact that for a fine to be an effective 
deterrence instrument it needs to be sufficiently high in order to constitute 
a significant amount to the offender; this Supreme Court believes that the 
deterrent and retributive penalty function is fully satisfied with a 
reasonable decrease of the amount established by the decision under 
appeal. So, this Court will grant this request to the appellants.  
Consequently, the fine on Whirlpool was reduced from 10,500 to 5,000 UTA (approximately 
US$4.9 million).  
This decision surprised the Competition experts in Chile and initiated a discussion that was 
mainly centred on the lack of dissuasive effects of the Chilean fines in competition cases28. 
Some authors have criticized the perceived lack of motivation and inconsistency in the 
reduction of the fine in this case by the Supreme Court, arguing that it would have been 
appropriate to recall the level of penalties levied on Whirlpool in other jurisdictions for this 
international cartel29. Certainly, the size of Whirlpool’s market share was not the same in 
Chile, the size of the market was different, and the penalties were mostly the product of a 
                                                          
27 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_122_Corte_Suprema.pdf, 32. 
28 http://lalibrecompetencia.com/2013/09/26/cartelicense-no-mas-la-negativa-senal-de-la-corte-suprema-chilena-
en-un-caso-reciente/ 
29 Araya Jasma, F. (2013) “Derecho de la Libre Competencia”, Revista Chilena de Derecho Privado 21, 433-
445. 
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settlement, yet their size was considerably larger than the level of the penalty accepted by 
the Supreme Court. For instance, in Brazil the penalty imposed was of the level of USD $ 53 
million, in the United States $ 49 million USD, and in Europe € 54 million. These fines are 
already reduced because Whirlpool had accepted responsibility, thus saving the social costs 
of litigation. This was not the case in Chile where Whirlpool opted to litigate, thus increasing 
the social costs of its conduct. A further objection to the approach followed by the Supreme 
Court in this case related to the need to ensure an optimal interaction between the level of 
penalties imposed and the design and operation of the leniency programme. It is necessary 
to impose on infringers severe penalties when acting illegally in order to enhance their ex 
ante incentives to enter into leniency programmes. An important asymmetry should exist 
between the company that voluntarily gives information and cooperates (in this case 
Tecumseh), and those that took a negative stance on cooperation (in this case Whirlpool). 
The reduction in the fine granted by the Supreme Court reduced this asymmetry, weakening 
the proper functioning of the Chilean leniency programme.  
Other authors remarked that according to established practice, the fine should be at least 
equal to the economic benefit obtained from the cartel multiplied by the probability of 
detection30. However, the Supreme Court had proceeded in this case to a reduction of more 
than 50% of a fine representing the cartel profits that the same Court had considered were 
correctly calculated by the TDLC. According to these authors, the Supreme Court sent the 
wrong signal to the market that building a cartel does not really matter, since the fine will 
always be less than the economic benefit procured by such infringement. It was further 
argued that the lack of qualitative reasons to reduce the fine rendered the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in this case highly negative for the Chilean competition law 
system. First it gave the feeling that white collar crime was not appropriately sanctioned. 
Second, the judgment also adversely affected the predictability and certainty of the Chilean 
system of sanctions. It created a perverse incentive for the FNE and the plaintiffs to request 
higher fines since there is a high probability that they will be diminished by the Supreme 
Court. The same author argued that this case illustrates how important it would be for the 
courts to rely not only on qualitative criteria but also mechanisms enabling them 
quantitatively to determine the amount of the penalty. The TDLC had moved in this 
direction, but the Supreme Court annulled the effects of its effort. 
------ 
 
There have also been some rare cases in which the Supreme Court has increased the fines 
imposed. 
 
8. FNE'S COMPLAINT  vs.  
Transportes Central Ltda. 
Collusion Transp 18-12- 29-12- Increased 
                                                          
30 Tapia, J. (2013) “La aplicación de multas a agentes económicos en el Derecho Chileno de la Libre 
Competencia, Una propuesta Metodológica” Estudios Públicos 132, 71-105. 
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y Otros, DECISION 94. ort 2007 2010 
 
Summary of case 
In 2008, the FNE filed a complaint against 9 minibuses transport companies and 4 taxi 
transport companies that provided services in Osorno, a southern city of Chile. The FNE 
argued that the companies had colluded and increased the transport fares, among other 
infringements.  
The TDLC found that 8 of the transport companies and the 4 taxi transport companies that 
provided services in Osorno had engaged in anticompetitive conduct by reaching an 
agreement to increase their fares. An interesting feature of this set of collusive practices 
was that they were orchestrated by the Regional Secretary of the Ministry of Transport.  
 
Fine requested by the FNE 
The FNE’s complaint was brief and requested a 100 UTA fine for the instigators of the 
agreement and a 50 UTA fine for the companies that were coerced to enter into the 
agreement31. There is no analysis of the benefits received by the companies and no 
economic reports were presented.  
 
Fine imposed by the TDLC 
On January 2010 the TDLC issued a judgement, holding that the cartel and its effects were 
proven32. For the purposes of determining the amount of the fine, the TDLC considered 
article 26.c DL No. 211, stating that the seriousness of the conduct, the economic benefit 
and previous offenses, should be taken into account.  
The TDLC found that the fares increase was of 50% for the minibuses and of 17% for the 
taxies, and that the fine should at least be equal to the economic benefit obtained by the 
involved companies. Nevertheless, the Tribunal noted that since the Regional Secretary of 
the Ministry of Transport induced the agreement, or at least helped to reach it, companies 
should not be heavily fined. Furthermore, some companies’ liability was alleviated since 
they were intimidated or forced  to sign the agreement. Finally, the Tribunal noted that the 
number of vehicles owned by every company should be taken into account when 
determining the fines. The TDLC decided to impose fines of UTA (Unidad Tributaria Annual) 
12, 8, 7, 4, and 3 to the different transport companies according to the weighting of the 
abovementioned factors.  
 
                                                          
31 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento_FNE_C_149_07.pdf 
32 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_94_%202010.pdf  
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Fine increased by the Supreme Court 
The transport companies and the FNE appealed and brought the case before the Supreme 
Court,33 which rejected the claims submitted by the transport companies and granted in 
part the FNE’s petition to increase the fines. The Supreme Court found that collusion was 
the most serious of all anticompetitive behaviours. It also found that the circumstance of 
the Regional Secretary of the Ministry of Transport’s intervention could diminish the liability 
of the involved transport companies, but not in such a magnitude as that considered by the 
TDLC. Therefore, the Supreme Court increased the fine of 2 of the transport companies to 
UTA 50 and increased the fine of 3 of the transport companies to UTA 35.  
 
3. Proposals for reform 
 
In recent years, there has been considerable attention brought to the analysis of the fining 
policy of the FNE and the TDLC and the impact of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the 
level of fines. A wide-ranging study, published in 2012, provides a thorough analysis of the 
fines imposed by the TDLC and the modifications brought by the Supreme Court’s 
judgments. The study includes tables comparing the imposed fines in the cases examined by 
the TDLC between 2008 and 2010. The study found that in the eight cases where a fine was 
imposed, and that was later reviewed by the Supreme Court, the latter has always modified 
the fine, increasing it in two occasions and diminishing it in six of them34.  
There are various reasons provided by the Supreme Court to alter the amount of fines 
imposed by the TDLC. One of the reasons commonly put forward, in at least three occasions, 
was that the considerations taken into account by the TDLC for determining the amount of 
the fine were not developed enough. Other reasons for lowering the amount of the fines 
related to the following factors: irreproachable past conduct of the defendant; 
proportionality; duration of the infringement; cooperative behaviour of the defendants; the 
fact that some aggravating circumstance was not applicable; that there was no information 
about the benefit obtained by the offence; and that the fine recommended by the FNE and 
accepted by the TDLC exceeded the maximum applicable by law at the time the 
infringement was done. The study showed that fines had been enforced in less than 28% of 
all the cases brought by the FNE until then35. The study also noted that the largest fine in 
Chile’s Competition Law history at the time (2010) was 40 % of the maximum allowed, and 
that the average amounted to 845 UTA. The medium was only UTA 95.5, equivalent to 0.5% 
of the maximum allowed. This information should be put into perspective if we consider 
that the Supreme Court has diminished fines by about 28% on average. The study further 
argued that if we take international comparisons into account, the maximum fine allowed in 
                                                          
33 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_94_Corte_Suprema.pdf, para 12. 
34 Romero Guzmán,J.J. (2012)  “Enforcement, Sanciones y Multas an el sistema de libre competencia Chileno » 
in La Libre Competencia en el Chile del Bicentenario , Santiago, Centro de Libre Competencia UC – Thomson 
Reuters, 503-537. Tables are available at pages 526, 527 and 529 of the study.  
35 Idem 535.  
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Chile was particularly low, although from a national perspective, it might be considered as 
substantially higher from those applicable in the regulation of the banking sector, sanitary 
sector, electricity and fuel sector, telecommunications sector, securities and the insurance 
sector36. Yet, as it was remarked by the study, in view of the difficulty of detecting 
competition law infringements, such as secret cartels, the FNE has a considerable 
disadvantage in comparison with the regulatory authorities, active in the above sectors, 
thus explaining why the penalties should be set at a higher level.  
In July 2012, a committee of well-known academics37 issued a report, which was submitted 
to the former president, Mr. Piñera. The report made recommendations to modify some 
aspects of Chile’s competition law system. Regarding the issue of fines, the members of the 
Commission envisaged possibilities to improve the current system. The Commission 
recommended that the fines imposed on companies should be based on some kind of scale 
or indicator, since determining the caused damage or the obtained profits from the illicit 
practice may be a very difficult operation. Specifically, the Commission recommended that 
fines should be estimated according to a percentage of the company’s annual sales during 
the period of the infringement plus an amount that would act as a deterrent.  
 
The Commission noted that the maximum amount of fines was recently raised by the legal 
reform of 2009 from 20,000 to 30.000 UTA. However, in the view of the Commission, this 
adjustment has made no difference since imposed fines have been generally far under the 
maximum permitted amount. In particular, it did not send a signal regarding the negative 
impact of anticompetitive behaviour and the importance lawmakers attached to the 
increase of the level of fines. The Commission observed that in practice fines had not 
increased.  
 
The Commission also made other recommendations such as to include criminal sanctions for 
top executives of the involved firms with the prohibition of serving as directors in publicly 
traded companies, or in managing positions during a period of 5 years. Criminal sanctions 
were recommended only by part of the Commission. In this matter opinions were divided.  
 
C. A comparative perspective:  tour d' horizon of the practice of judicial scrutiny and the 
role of the courts in promoting effective competition law enforcement 
 
1. The EU level 
 
In Les Verts v. European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) emphasized that 
the European Community is a community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its 
                                                          
36 A table compares the applicable fines in all these sector-specific regulations at page 531. 
37 Tomás Flores Jaña, Francisco Rosende Ramírez, Aldo González Tissinetti, Arturo Yrarrázaval Covarrubias, 
Blanca Palumbo Ossa, Domingo Valdés Prieto, Francisco Agüero Vargas, Ricardo Jungmann Davies, 
Ronald Fischer Barkan, Anita Holuigue Barros, Enrique Vergara Vial, Jorge Rodríguez Grossi, Hermann 
von Gersdorff Trömel. 
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Member states not its institutions can avoid judicial review of their actions to determine 
whether those actions are in conformity with the Treaty38. The control of legality exercised 
by the European judiciary of the measures adopted by the European institutions constitutes 
the cornerstone of this institutional framework.39 
There are two routes to contest the legality of the remedial action of the European 
Commission. First, Article 263 TFEU provides that the Court may review the legality of the 
decisions or acts of the Commission that are capable of affecting the interests of individuals. 
Challenges are made at first instance to the General Court of the EU,40 and appeals on 
points of law can be made from the General Court to the CJEU. Second, the judicial control 
of the appropriateness of the amount of fines is more intensive, following the interplay of 
Article 261 TFEU and of Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003. Pursuant to these provisions, the 
CJEU is endowed with unlimited jurisdiction to assess the appropriateness of, and if 
necessary to vary, downward or upward, the amount of the fine imposed by the 
Commission. Hence, it has judicial scrutiny over material errors of law, facts, procedural 
irregularities, unreasonable exercise of discretion, and, under certain circumstances, also 
over evaluative judgments and predictions of the European Commission. The Court is not 
able to impose a different fine but to rule on existing fines set by decisions of the 
Commission41.    
Concerning the possibilities of challenging the decisions of the European Commission, those 
to which the latter are directly addressed, together with third parties who can demonstrate 
“direct and individual concern” (such as, inter alia, competitors), may file an appeal with the 
General Court. The grounds of review are lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its 
application, and misuse of powers. The European Courts do not exercise a formal appellate 
jurisdiction on the merits, but a simple control of legality, although with regard to fines they 
may substitute their own assessment to that of the European Commission. Yet, as we have 
previously noted, this is limited to the grounds of the Commission’s decision that were 
found illegal. 
The intensity of review  is traditionally a limited one under Article 263 TFEU.  The General 
Court cannot “remake” the Commission’s decision or inquire on the merits of it, but it can 
only verify whether the Commission has produced sufficiently precise and coherent proof to 
support its case, whether it has misinterpreted or misapplied the law, or has made a 
“manifest error of appraisal” in the statement of the facts or the assessment of the evidence 
before it, so that the latter cannot support its conclusions as to the nature—whether 
                                                          
38Case C-294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1357, para. 23. 
39 The General Court was called Court of First Instance, before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
December 2009. It was originally set up in 1989. The Court of Justice (ECJ) is assisted by Advocates 
general who deliver an opinion on a case prior to the judgment of the ECJ. 
40 A fast track procedure is available in certain cases. See codified rules of the General Court, Art. 76a. 
41 Case T-275/94, Groupement des cartes bancaires "CB"/Commission [1995] ECR II-2169, paras 59 & 60.  See 
e.g. GERARD, ‘EU cartel law and the shaking foundations of judicial review’,(July 10, 2010). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1675451 at 4. 
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unlawful or otherwise--of the practice42. However, since its creation in 1989, the General 
Court has intensified the judicial control of the Commission’s decisions, as it is now possible 
to conduct a systematic examination of the factual basis of the decision of the Commission. 
The CJEU focuses more on questions of law than questions of facts. However, the General 
Court has traditionally not interfered with the exercise by the Commission of complex 
economic and technical appraisals unless there is a manifest error.43 Some observers are of 
the view that the General Court varies the intensity of judicial review across the judicial 
control exercised in applications of Article 101(1), 101(3), 102, or merger control. Others 
interpret the recent Court cases to indicate that the intensity of judicial review has been 
raised to, in substance, full judicial review across the board. Since the annulment of the 
three merger decisions Schneider, Tetra Laval and Airtours,44 the General Court pays only lip 
service to the marginal review standard, and in substance exercises full judicial review of 
infringement decisions.45 The review has been “rigorous” (in particular for mergers and 
Article 101(3)46, as well as in Article 102 cases).47 In other recent cases, however, the 
European Court of Justice has supported and emphasized the wide degree of discretion of 
the European Commission, for example in the adoption of commitment decisions under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 (negotiated remedies), by applying differently the principle of 
proportionality in this context than for decisions adopted under Article 7 (imposed 
                                                          
42See e.g. case 42/84, Remia and others v Commission, [1985] ECR 2545, para. 26. 
43Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 87-89. 
44 Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Commission) [2002] ECR II-2585; Case T-77/02, Schneider Electric SA v 
Commission, [2002] ECR II-4201; Case T-80/02 Tetra Laval BV v Commission, [2002] ECR II-4519; Case 
C-12/03P, Commission v. Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987. 
45 Editorial Comments (2011) “Towards a more judicial approach? EU antitrust fines under the scrutiny of 
fundamental rights” Common Market Law Review 48, 1405, 1406; Schweitzer, H.  (2013) “Judicial Review 
in EU Competition Law”, in Lianos, I. and Geradin, D. (eds) Handbook on European Competition Law, 
Edward Elgar 537. (“Despite the much-repeated ‘margin of discretion’ formula, the consistent exercise of 
full judicial review with a view to the interpretation and the application of substantive competition law is at 
its core. [...] The Commission continues to enjoy a margin of discretion that is beyond full judicial review 
only where it enjoys real policy discretion.”); Wils, W.P.J. (2014) “The Compatibility with Fundamental 
Rights of the EU Antitrust Enforcement System in which the European Commission Acts both as 
Investigator and as First-Instance Decision Maker” World Competition 37, 5, 15-16 (“I do not have the 
impression that the General Court, even in those cases, such as the Microsoft case, where it stated that its 
review was limited to manifest errors, in fact abstained from exercising a full review in respect of all the 
pleas raised by the applicant against the Commission’s decision”). See also Forwood, N. (2011) “The 
Commission’s ‘More Economic Approach – Implications for the Role of the EU Courts, the Treatment of 
Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review” in Marquis, M. and Ehlermann , C.-D. (eds.), EUI 
Competition Law Annual 2009, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 255, 264. 
46 See, Case C-12/03P, Commission v. Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987 (mergers); Case T-168/01, 
GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, confirmed by case C-501/06P, Commission 
v. GlaxosmithKline Services Unlimited [2009] ECR I-9291. See also Vesterdorf, B. (2005) “Standard of 
Proof in Merger Cases” European Competition Journal 1(1), 3-33., in particular 17-19. 
47 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission) [2007] ECR II-3601, para. 89: “[W]hile the Community Courts 
recognise that the Commission has a margin of appreciation in economic or technical matters, that does not 
mean that they must decline to review the Commission’s interpretation of economic or technical data. The 
Community Courts must not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable 
and consistent but must also determine whether that evidence contains all the relevant data that must be 
taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it (see, to that effect, concerning merger control, Case C‑12/03 P Commission v 
Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I‑987, paragraph 39).”  
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remedies)48. Upon annulment, the case is remitted to the Commission for a fresh 
examination of the issues or evidence. 
The intensity of review under Article 261 TFEU is a higher one. The General Court has not 
shied away from subjecting the Commission’s decisions on fines to strict scrutiny, in view of 
the “unlimited jurisdiction” it disposes with regard to penalties. The scope of this “unlimited 
jurisdiction” was exposed by the CJEU as being relatively broad, the EU judicature being 
“empowered to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction where the question of the amount of the 
fine is before it”49. Yet, the “unlimited jurisdiction” from which the General Court benefits 
may be subject to various interpretations. Commenting on the meaning in practice of the 
term, former President of the General Court, Bo Vesterdorf observed the following: 
“Even if Article 23(3) of Regulation 1/2003 only indicates that the elements to be 
taken into consideration in calculating the fine are gravity and duration, it follows 
clearly from the case-law that the Commission, and therefore certainly also the 
Community Courts, must consider all relevant facts and circumstances of the case 
[…] which must include the overall general fairness of the sanction on view of all the 
general circumstances of any particular case. The unlimited jurisdiction granted to 
the Community Courts under Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 and Article [261 TFEU] 
permits them to perform precisely this type of assessment. In view of the ever 
increasing level of fines imposed by the Commission, fines which now may amount 
to more than one billion Euros on a single undertaking and who knows how much 
more next time […] it is my humble submission that it is not so much necessary that 
the Community Courts fully exercise their unlimited jurisdiction and not just verify if 
the Guidelines have been correctly followed by the Commission”50. 
 
The approach followed by the EU Courts has been variable. The General Court has 
proceeded to an intensive scrutiny of the Commission’s decision, eventually substituting its 
own interpretation of the law, when they found that the Commission’s decision was based 
on errors of law. For instance, in view of Article 23(3) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission 
is bound to take into account both the gravity and the duration of the infringement. In 
addition, the Commission has adopted Guidelines binding its own discretion, in view of the 
principle of legitimate expectations, with the aim to ensure greater legal certainty for 
undertakings. The Court thus makes sure that the legal framework of Regulation 1/2003 is 
respected, as well as general principles of EU law (e.g. proportionality), while it also 
interferes with the methodology adopted by the Commission in a specific case, if this does 
                                                          
48 See, more recently case C-441/07, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949. 
49 Case C-3/06 P Groupe Danone v. Commission [2007] ECR I-1331, para. 62. 
50 Vesterdorf, B. (2009) “The Court of Justice and Unlimited Jurisdiction: What does it mean in practice?” 
Antirust Chronicle 6. 
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not comply with the methodology advanced by the Commission in its Guidelines, according 
to the principles of EU administrative law51.  
With regard to errors of facts or unreasonable exercise of discretion, the General Court has 
been attentive to situations such as that in GDF-Suez, in which the General Court reduced 
the fine as the Commission had not established to the requisite legal standard the duration 
of part of the infringement. The Court reduced the fine, but not according to the 
Commission’s methodology, as this would have led to a “greatly disproportionate” 
reduction “to the relative importance of the error which has been found to exist”, as this 
would have resulted in a reduction of the fine of more than 50%52. 
Although the Court has mentioned in several occasions that in exercising its unlimited 
jurisdiction, “it must make its own appraisal, taking account of all the circumstances of the 
case”, it has been relatively reluctant to depart from the methodology set out in the 
Commission’s Guidelines53. For instance, the Court referred to the 2006 Guidelines of the 
European Commission and the Commission’s previous decisional practice as useful 
“guidance” in order to calculate the fine54. Although it is clear that the EU Courts do not 
consider these Guidelines binding on them, they have, on certain occasions held that they 
may have to rely on the methodology set forth when reviewing the fine, as the exercise of 
unlimited jurisdiction cannot result in discrimination between undertakings which have 
participated in anticompetitive conduct55. According to some commentators, “(i)n recent 
judgments this standard of review seems to be interpreted by the Court as […] ensuring that 
the considerations which the Commission relied on are ‘coherent and objectively justified’, 
which implied that ‘the Courts must not immediately substitute their own assessment for 
that of the Commission’; or as controlling that the fine is proportionate to the gravity and 
duration of the infringement and weighing the gravity of the infringement and the 
circumstances invoked by the applicant”56. It is not clear which are the limits of the 
discretion that the Commission is offered, in the presence of a complex economic and 
technical appraisal. Most would agree that the “policymaking discretion” of the Commission 
should be protected; yet, what about “executing discretion”? According to some 
commentators, “it is doubtful that, for instance, granting a reduction of the fine to an 
undertaking which benefits from the leniency procedure by taking into consideration only 
                                                          
51 According to the case law of the CJEU, in Case C-397/03 P Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels 
Midland Ingredients v Commission [2006] ECR I-4429, para 91, “[…] the Commission must comply with its 
self-imposed rules”). See also, Case C-389/10 P, KME Germany and Others v Commission, para 127, “ […] 
Guidelines are a case of self-limitation on the Commission's part”. 
52 Case T-370/09 GDF Suex v. Commission [2012] ECR not yet published, para. 466. 
53 Case T-360/09 E.ON Ruhrgas v. Commission, para. 301; Case T-370/09 GDF Suex v. Commission [2012] 
ECR not yet published, para. 462. 
54 See, for instance, Case C-441/11 P, Commission v. Verhuizingen Coppens, [December 6, 2012], not yet 
published, para. 80; Case T-357/06, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v. Commission [September 27, 2012], 
paras 253-255.  
55 See, Case T-362/06, Ballast Nedam Infra BV v European Commission [Septemebr 27, 2012], paras 143-145. 
56 Barbier de la Serre, E. and Lagathu, E.  (2013) “The Law on Fines Imposed in EU Competition proceedings: 
Faster, Higher, harsher” Journal of Competition Law & Practice 4(4), 325-344, 340. 
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the timing, as opposed to the usefulness and quality of the information, requires any 
complex assessments”57. 
In any case, the powers of review are ostensibly confined to a “manifest error”-type review 
when the appeal relates to the complex economic and legal assessment of the findings 
made by the Commission as to the nature and impact of the alleged infringement58.  The 
General Court has explained in a number of judgments that the limited nature of this 
scrutiny is justified by the need to preserve the “inter-institutional balance” within the 
Union and especially to prevent the Courts from encroaching upon the discretionary powers 
of the Commission in the area of competition policy59. This is also the case in the context of 
setting fines. On several occasions, the Court held that the Commission enjoyed a “wide 
margin of discretion when setting the amount of fines”60. The judicial control exercised in 
areas in which the Commission maintains discretion, such as “the starting amount of a fine 
or the uplift for duration” is limited to ascertaining that the Commission has not committed 
a manifest error61. 
It could be argued that the General Court, despite being able to consider the extent to 
which the Commission provided a sufficiently clear and exhaustive statement of reasons in 
respect to the “necessity” of the amount of the fine in each case, remains constrained in its 
ability to appraise its suitability in light of the nature/gravity of the infringement and its 
duration.  However, although it is acknowledged that the review powers of the EU Courts 
are limited to a “manifest error” type of review in cases involving complex economic 
appraisals, it should be noted that in some recent cases, the Court of Justice prescribed 
rigorous standards of judicial review for the decisions of the Commission by the General 
Court and established its full jurisdiction to review decisions in which the Commission 
imposes fines. In particular, the Court held that “the Courts cannot use the Commission's 
margin of discretion - either as regards the choice of factors taken into account in the 
application of the criteria mentioned in the Guidelines (of the Commission) […] or as regards 
the assessment of those factors - as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth 
review of the law and of the facts”.62 
                                                          
57 Barbier de la Serre, E. and Lagathu, E.  (2013) “The Law on Fines Imposed in EU Competition proceedings: 
Faster, Higher, harsher” Journal of Competition Law & Practice 4(4), 325-344, 341. 
58Inter alia, case T-112/99, Metropole Television and others v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459, para. 114; 
59 E.g. joined cases T-68, 77-78/89, SocietàItalianaVetroSpA and Others v Commission, [1992] ECR II-1403, 
para. 319-320; also case T-65/98, Van den Bergh v Commission, [2003] ECR II-4653, para. 135; more 
recently, case C-194/99 P, Thyssen Stahl AG v Commission of the European Communities, [2003] ECR I-
10821, para. 73; case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European 
Communities, [2006] ECR II-2969, para. 57. 
60 For instance, Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v Commission [2005] ECR II-4407, para. 134; Case T-336/07, 
Telefonica v. Commission [March 29, 2012], para 430. 
61 E.g., Case T-439/07 Coats Holding v. Commission, para. 185. 
62  See, Case C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission [2011] ECR I-13085, 
para. 62. See also, Case C-389/10 P KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v. European 
Commission,  [2011] ECR I-13125; Case C-272/09 P KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy 
SpA v. European Commission [2011] ECR I-12789. 
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Yet, limits relating to the different functions of competition authorities and courts exercising 
a judicial review may limit judicial scrutiny of complex economic assessments63. The 
Commission is offered some “degree of latitude” as to the choice of interpretation of the 
economic elements that it takes into account in its decisions, “provided that those choices 
are not manifestly contrary to the accepted rules of economic discipline and are not applied 
inconsistently”64. It is on the applicant to put forward reasons that the Commission’s effort 
“was not based on sound economics”65. 
In the context of the exercise by the General Court of an unlimited jurisdiction on fines, it 
was suggested that “in practice […] the case-law gives the European Commission significant 
leeway in the calculation of fines”66. First, the basic amount of the fine, which is related to 
the value of sales, depends on the gravity of the infringement, the latter being determined 
by reference to numerous factors, such as “the particular circumstances of the case, its 
context and the dissuasive effect of fines”, “no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria 
which must be applied” having been drawn up67. The Commission may thus be free to 
interpret the individual circumstances of the case and depart from its previous practice, if 
this is not part of the legal framework68. Accordingly, the Commission may impose penalties 
at a higher level than the ones it has imposed in the past for certain categories of 
infringements, if raising the fines is considered necessary in order to ensure the 
implementation of competition policy and the objective of general prevention69. For 
instance, the General Court has only proceeded to a limited review of the multiplier applied 
to reflect the duration of the infringement, accepting that its “review of the lawfulness of 
the exercise of the Commission’s discretion in the matter must confine itself to checking 
that the thresholds set are coherent and objectively justified and the Courts must not 
immediately substitute their own assessment for that of the Commission”70. 
The Commission benefits from a considerable margin of appreciation with regard to the 
individualization of the fine, in particular when it decides whether or not to take into 
account mitigating or aggravating circumstances. For instance, in order to determine the 
existence of aggravating circumstances, the Commission may take into account various 
factors, such as the nature of the infringement, the market share of the undertakings 
concerned, etc., the control of the General Court being limited to whether the Commission 
                                                          
63 Laguna de Paz, J.C. (2014) “Understanding the limits of judicial review in European Competition Law”, 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2(1), 203-224,218. 
64 Case T-351/03, Schneider Electric SA v. Commission [2007] ECR II-2237, para. 132. 
65 Laguna de Paz, J.C. (2014) “Understanding the limits of judicial review in European Competition Law”, 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2(1), 203-224,218, referring to a proposal made by Heike Schweitzer. 
66 Laguna de Paz, J.C. (2014) “Understanding the limits of judicial review in European Competition Law”, 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2(1), 203-224,220. 
67 Case C-219/95 P Ferriere Nord v. Commission [1997] ECR I-4411, para. 33. 
68 Case C-167/04 P JCB Service v. Commission [2006] ECR I-8935, para. 205; Joined Cases C-125/07, C-
133/07 P, C-135/07 P and C-137/07 P, Erste Group Bank AG etc v. Commission [2009] ECR I-8681, para. 
233. 
69 Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique diffusion française and Others v. Commission [1983] ECR 1825, 
para. 109; case T-23/99 LR AF 1998 v. Commission [2002] ECR II 1705, paras 236-237; Case T-76/08 El 
du Pont de Nemours and others v. Commission [February 2, 2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:46, para. 126. 
70 Case T-76/08 El du Pont de Nemours and others v. Commission [February 2, 2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:46, 
para. 127. 
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has departed from the methodology of the Guidelines, has proceeded to an increase that is 
“manifestly disproportionate”, or has refused to take into account other factors, such as the 
financial losses of the undertaking71. Similarly, with regard to mitigating circumstances, the 
Commission has been granted a degree of latitude in making the overall assessment of the 
extent to which a reduction of fines may be made72. The General Court has carried out, for 
instance, a limited review of the assessment made by the Commission of the cooperation 
provided by undertakings in order to benefit from the reduction of the fine73. In addition, 
the General Court has recognized the Commission’s discretion in calculating the deterrent 
effect of the fine, exercising a limited review in this case74. Judicial scrutiny is also limited in 
the context of the appreciation by the Commission of the quality and usefulness of the 
cooperation provided by the undertaking, the Commission enjoying some discretion when 
considering the application of leniency, in particular by reference to the contributions made 
by other undertakings75. Only an obvious error of appraisal may be censured, the 
complainant having to show that in the absence of the information provided, the 
Commission would not have been able to prove the infringement. 
In a recent wide-ranging statistical analysis of the judicial review of the Commission’s 
decisions before the European Court of Justice and the General Court in the period of 2001-
2005, Tridimas and Gari observe that out of 344 actions for annulment launched before the 
General court (then named CFI) during the period 2001-2005, 98 were contested 
competition decisions (28.8%) and 57 (16,8%) contested state aids76. According to the 
authors, “(a)ctions lodged against competition measures are the most likely to succeed with 
a rate of success of 44.9 per cent”, the measure of success being the total or partial 
annulment of the decision or the revision of the fine77. These findings may indicate that 
judicial oversight of the European Commission’s decisions in competition law has an impact 
on competition law enforcement and does not constitute a mere formal rubber stamping 
exercise, despite the considerable discretion given the Commission in complex economic 
                                                          
71 Case T-25/05, KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v European Commission [2010] 
ECR II-91, paras 114-117. 
72 Case T-83/08, Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha and Denka Chemicals GmbH v Commission [2012] 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:48, para. 240, “(t)he adoption of the Guidelines has not rendered irrelevant the previous 
case-law under which the Commission enjoys a discretion as to whether or not to take account of certain 
matters when setting the amount of the fines it intends imposing, by reference to the circumstances of the 
case. Thus, in the absence of any binding indication in the Guidelines regarding the mitigating 
circumstances that may be taken into account, it must be concluded that the Commission has retained a 
degree of latitude in making an overall assessment of the extent to which a reduction of fines may be made 
in respect of mitigating circumstances”. 
73 E.g. Case T-76/08 El du Pont de Nemours and others v. Commission [February 2, 2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:46, 
paras 138 and 145; Case T-77/08 Dow Chemicals v. Commission, [2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:47, para. 164. 
74 Joined cases 100 to 103/80, SA Musique Diffusion française and others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, 
paras 106-109 (“the proper application of the Community competition rules requires that the Commission may 
at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy”).  
75 For instance, Case T-38/02, Groupe Danone v Commission [2005] ECR II-4407, para. 455 ; Case T-44/00, 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission [2004] ECR II-2223, para. 301. 
76 Tridimas, P.T. and Gari, G. (2010) “Winners and Losers in Luxembourg: A statistical analysis of judicial 
review before the European court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2001-2005)” European Law 
Review 35(2), 131-173, 160. 
77Id., at 161. The rate of success of actions of annulment against state aids decisions, agriculture, the law 
governing institutions and commercial policy is significantly lower. 
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and technical appraisals78. This is particularly so in view of the intensive judicial scrutiny 
exercised over the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission. 
A recent empirical study of Camesasca, Ywesyn, Weck and Bowman (2013) has delved into 
the cartel precedents of both the General Court and the Court of Justice in the period 
January 1998 through September 2012, which included 200 General Court judgments and 
69 Court of justice judgments79. The appeals had been lodged against 75 Commission 
investigations, some of which related to re-adoptions of annulled decisions. Camesasca et al 
found that “Commission decisions are upheld on appeal, save for rare exceptions”80. For 
instance, out of the 660 pleas directed against fines, only 59 were successful, that is less 
than 10%. Among those that succeeded most often, Camesasca et al cited those challenging 
the proportionality of the infringement duration (23%), those claiming discrimination (17%), 
or a misapplication of the Leniency Notice (13%). In contrast, pleas challenging the 
assessment by the Commission of turnover, gravity and mitigating circumstances, 
“succeeded only where the appellant could show some discriminatory element in the 
Commission’s fining decision”81. The success rate was even lower at the Court of Justice of 
the EU, as only one plea (concerning the misapplication of the Leniency Notice) was 
successful out of the 85 put forward all these years82. However, the number of successful 
pleas may not be the best measure for the level of judicial scrutiny. Of the total number of 
510 individual appeals in the sample in Camesasca et al., only approximately 200 had been 
ruled on by the European courts. In 104 cases, the fine was upheld by the GC, and in 69 
cases by the Court of Justice. In 31 appeals, the fine was annulled by either the General 
Court (29) or the CJEU (2). In 69 further cases, the fine was reduced (in 67 cases by the 
General Court, in two cases by the CJEU). It should be noted, however, that many of the 
reductions of the fine were only modest. 
A similar self-restraint may be observed with regard to the control exercised by the CJEU on 
the judgments of the General Court. The CJEU recognizes that it should not substitute its 
own assessment on grounds of fairness for that of the General Court when the latter 
exercises its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings 
for infringements of European Union law83. Hence, “only inasmuch as the Court of Justice 
considers that the level of the penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive to the 
                                                          
78 See, however, Geradin, D. and Petit, N. (2010) “Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment”, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011-008,  
Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 01/201. 1Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698342 noting 
the lack of effective judicial review of the decisions of the Commission in the enforcement of Article 102 
TFEU, as opposed to article 101 TFEU and merger control. 
79 Camesasca, P., Ywesyn,J.  Weck, T.  and Bowman,B. (2013) “Cartel Appeals to the Court of Justice: the 
Song of the Sirens?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 4(3), 215. 
80 Camesasca, P., Ywesyn,J.  Weck, T.  and Bowman,B. (2013) “Cartel Appeals to the Court of Justice: the 
Song of the Sirens?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 4(3), 215, 217. 
81 Camesasca, P., Ywesyn,J.  Weck, T.  and Bowman,B. (2013) “Cartel Appeals to the Court of Justice: the 
Song of the Sirens?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 4(3), 215, 218. 
82 Camesasca, P., Ywesyn,J.  Weck, T.  and Bowman,B. (2013) “Cartel Appeals to the Court of Justice: the 
Song of the Sirens?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 4(3), 215, 219. 
83 Case C-89/11 P E.ON Energie v. Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:738, para. 125. 
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point of being disproportionate, would it have to find that the General Court erred in law, 
due to the inappropriateness of the amount of a fine”84. 
It has been argued that given the broadly “criminal nature” of these infringements the EU 
Courts should be empowered to exert  more stringent control over the lawfulness of 
antitrust decisions, so as to encompass all matters of law and fact concerning each case,  
and, therefore, to have the discretion to take a “fresh look” at cases.85  It is suggested that 
the European Convention on Human Rights constitutes perhaps the most significant factor 
in the current pressure for the development of stricter standards of judicial review.   
 
Already in its Nold judgment the Court of Justice had recognised that although the 
Convention was not a part of Community law, it played a key role as a “source of 
inspiration” in shaping the standards of protection of fundamental rights enshrined in the 
general principles of EC law.86 However, the Court emphasised that these standards were 
autonomous from both the domestic legal traditions of the Member States and the 
Convention itself, and consequently would have to be “subject to certain limits justified by 
the overall objectives pursued by the Community”.87   Consequently, a question emerges as 
to whether EU law strikes a “fair balance” between the need to secure due process tights 
and the interest to the effective functioning of the EU institutions, so that the former are 
not impaired in their essence.88 The issue is of particular salience now, since the Treaty of 
Lisbon makes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding, and with it the 
“minimum” level of protection provided by the Convention to rights and freedoms that are 
common to both instruments.89  The Treaty also creates the legal basis for the Union to 
accede to the ECHR, thus paving the way for the former to become subject to the 
jurisdiction and the oversight of the Strasbourg Court.   
                                                          
84 Id., para. 126. 
85 See Appl. Nos. 7299/75 and 7496/76, Albert &LeCompte v Belgium, [1983] 5 EHRR 533, para. 29; also, inter 
alia, appl. No 19178/91, Bryan v United Kingdom, [1996] 21 EHRR 342, para. 46 of the judgment; see also 
Commission Opinion, separate concurring Opinion of Mr N. Bratza, p. 354.  For commentary, see e.g. 
Andreangelli et al. (2010) “Enforcement by the Commission – the decisional and enforcement structure in 
antitrust cases and the Commission’s fining system”, in Merola, M. & Waelbroeck, D.  (eds.), Towards an 
optimal enforcement of competition rules in Europe, Bruylant, Brussels, Chapter 3. 
86 Case 4/73, Nold v Commission, [1974] ECR 491, para. 13. 
87 Id., para. 14. 
88 See appl. No 24833/94, Matthews v United Kingdom, [1999] 28 EHRR 361, especially para. 33-34; also appl. 
No 45036/98, Bosphorous Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, judgment of 30 June 
2005, [2006] 42 EHRR 1, especially paras. 154-165. For commentary, see e.g. Schermers, H.G. (1999) 
“Matthews v United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999” Common Market Law Review 36, 673; 
Canor, I. (2000) “Primus inter pares. Who is the ultimate guardian of Fundamental Rights in Europe”, 
European Law Review 25, 3; Costello, C. (2006) “The Bosphorus ruling of the European Court of Human 
Rights: fundamental rights and blurred boundaries in Europe”, Human Rights Law Review 6, 87.  
89Article 52(3), EU Charter:  “Insofar as this Carter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.  This provision shall not prevent 
Union law from providing more extensive protection.”  For commentary, inter alia, Lemmens, P. (2001) 
“The relation between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European 
Convention of Human Rights—Substantive aspects”, Maastricht Journal of European And Comparative 
Law 8, 49, 54. Also Arnull, A. (2003) “From Charter to Constitution and beyond: Fundamental Rights in 
the new European Union”, Public Law Winter, 774, 786. 
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According to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), everyone has 
the right to a “fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law” 
in all proceedings that are decisive for the “determination of civil rights and obligations or of 
a criminal charge”.  Although none of the Convention norms lay down specific 
“administrative fairness” standards applicable to proceedings before non-judicial 
authorities, the Court adopted a substantive test to determine whether the exercise of 
administrative powers by public authorities could be considered as falling within the scope 
of Article 6(1),.90   
Thus, the Strasbourg Court took the view that the existence of a “criminal charge” should be 
dependent on substantive factors, namely “the nature and severity of the offence and the 
penalty,” and “the purpose of the fine”, i.e. whether the latter “was both deterrent and 
punitive (…).”91  Similarly, as regards the interpretation of the concept of a “determination 
of civil rights and obligations”, it was held in the LeCompte, Van Leuven and DeMeyere 
judgment that the French term “‘contestation’ (dispute)… (…) should be given a substantive 
rather than formal meaning”:92 Article 6(1) ECHR should therefore be applicable to all 
proceedings, be they judicial or administrative, whose “result (…) [is] directly decisive”93 for 
the existence or the exercise of a substantive right.94   
This approach was applied to define the nature, for Convention purposes, of competition 
proceedings in domestic law.  In Stenuit,95 the now defunct European Commission on 
Human Rights stated that, in consideration of the “nature of the offence”, the enforcement 
of French competition law nevertheless possessed a “criminal aspect…for the purpose of the 
Convention”.96  The Human Rights Commission pointed to a “combination of concordant 
factors”97 including the goal of the provisions, which was “to maintain free competition 
within the French market”,98 their general scope of application,99 and the deterrent nature 
of the penalty provided for those responsible, i.e. 5% of their total annual revenue.100   
The recognition that competition proceedings possess a “criminal character” or a “quasi-
criminal” dimension has important implications for the “due process” rules applicable within 
the EU enforcement framework. An important discussion is currently raging on the 
                                                          
90 See e.g. Appl. No 7598/76, Kaplan v United Kingdom, Commission Decision, [1982] 4 EHRR 64, para. 150.  
For commentary, inter alia, BOYLE, “Administrative justice, judicial review and the right to a fair hearing 
under the European Convention on Human Rights”, (1984) PL 89 at 90. 
91Ovey, C.  and White, R.C.A (2002) Jacobs and White European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd Ed.,: 
Oxford University Press 141. 
92 Series A No 43, LeCompte, Van Leuven and de Meyere v Belgium, [1982] 4 EHRR 1, para. 45. 
93 Id.,  para. 47. 
94 Appl. No 10426/83, Pudas v Sweden, [1988] 10 EHRR 380, para. 31. 
95 Appl. No 11598/85, Stenuit v France, [1992] ECC 401. 
96 Id., para. 61. 
97 Id., para. 66. 
98 Id., para. 62. 
99 Id., para. 63. 
100 Id., para. 64.  See also, mutatis mutandis, appl. No 37971/97, Ste Colas Est and others v France, judgment of 
16 April 2002, para. 46, 48-49. 
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compatibility of the structural characteristics of the competition framework in the EU legal 
system with the Convention of Human Rights, in particular whether an “integrated agency” 
such as the European Commission, and the judicial stage of the proceedings to which it is 
subject, fulfils the requirements of “fairness” provided by the Convention. 
 
According to the Strasbourg Court, providing that their decision was open to the scrutiny of 
a full court of law in respect to all matters of fact and law,101 administrative bodies could 
pursue and punish those responsible for “penal” infringements102. As a result, it is argued 
that the existence of the jurisdiction of the General Court to review the Commission’s 
decisions could make the EU system fully compatible with Article 6 ECHR103. Although the 
CJEU has not taken directly a position as to the compatibility of the EU enforcement regime 
with Article 6, it has held that the system is compatible with the principle of effective judicial 
protection laid down in Article 47 EUCFR. According to the CJEU, this princiople “implements 
in European Union law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR”, since the review 
process before the Courts of the Union “in fact involves review of both the law and the 
facts, and means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested 
decision and to alter the amount of fines”104. The Court also held that “the unlimited 
jurisdiction conferred on the General Court in relation to fines by the Treaty and by 
European Union legislation, which enables it to substitute its own assessment of the fine for 
that of the Commission, goes beyond what is necessary for the purpose of compliance with 
the ECHR, since the latter simply requires the Court to be able to establish whether there 
are errors of fact”105. 
 
Furthermore, although fines have increased in aggregate, some recent studies on the 
European Commission’s cartel fines found that these were considerably less than provided 
for in the 2006 Guidelines and that the average fine per firm has declined significantly since 
2007106. It was also argued that the European Court of Human Rights, which developed the 
“substantive approach” to the determination of the nature—criminal or civil—of penalties, 
drew a distinction between “criminal offences” that belong to the “hard core of criminal 
law,” and those infringements which do not meet the same degree of gravity, and therefore 
                                                          
101 Wils, W.P.J. (2010) “The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial review and the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, World Competition 33(1), 1, 21–22; also, Merola, M. & Waelbroeck, D.  
(eds.), Towards an optimal enforcement of competition rules in Europe, Bruylant, Brussels. (fn. 167). 476–
80. 
102 See e.g. appl. Nos.7299/75 and 7496/76, Albert &LeCompte v Belgium, [1983] 5 EHRR 533, para.29; also 
more recently, appl. No 15809/02 and 25624/02, O’Halloran and Francis v UK, judgment of 29 June 2007, 
available in [2008] 46 EHRR 21, especially para. 56–57 
103 HOUSE of LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE on the EUROPEAN UNION, XIXth Report, session 1999–
2000, 21/11/2000, para 56. Cf. evidence given by Sir Christopher Bellamy, ibid.,para. 56 in respect to 
decisions not imposing penalties, e.g. decisions imposing commitments. See also, Judgment of the ECtHR, 
September 27, 2011, A. Meranini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, Application No 43509/08 
104 Case C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission [2011] ECR I-13085, paras 
51-52 (emphasis added). 
105 Id., para. 43. 
106 See, Veljanovski, C. (2010) “European Cartel Fines Under the 2006 Penalty Guidelines—A Statistical 
Analysis” Case Associates.  Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723843 
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lie outside that “core”107.  Thus, it was suggested that in cases concerning infringements of 
the latter kind the safeguards enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention and expressly 
applicable to “criminal” cases should not apply with the same stringency as in proceedings 
affecting natural persons accused of “hard core” criminal offences.  
 
Yet concerns have been expressed, even by the members of the CJEU. In a recent, non-
binding, yet strongly worded Opinion to the Court, Advocate General (AG) Wathelet called 
on the General Court to exercise fully its unlimited jurisdiction when reviewing the 
proportionality of fines. AG Wathelet referred to both Article 47 TFEU and the ECHR noting 
that the General Court’s assessment should be sufficiently independent from that of the 
Commission, in that the General Court may neither solely refer to the amount set by the 
Commission – in a relatively arbitrary fashion, […] for the basic amount – nor feel bound by 
the Commission’s calculations or the circumstances that the Commission had taken into 
account108. He lamented the fact that too often the General Court has limited itself to 
assessing whether the Commission applied its own Fining Guidelines correctly, despite the 
General Court not itself being bound by those Guidelines109. Furthermore, the AG observed 
that the General Court should not refer anymore to the “large” or “substantial” margin of 
appreciation of the Commission in the setting of fines, but should make an in-depth legal 
and factual review of the fine by carrying out, itself, the assessment of whether the fine 
imposed was proportionate, and by checking that all the relevant elements were actually 
taken into account110. It remains to be seen if the CJEU will follow the proposals of the 
Advocate General. 
Interesting as it is, the debate over the compatibility of the European enforcement regime 
with the high standards of due process included in the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, remains, however, of limited 
practical utility beyond the EU, and in particular for Chile, although it may offer interesting 
insights on the difficult compromises that administrative enforcement systems face, in 
comparison to the prosecutorial system chosen by the Chilean legislator in order to balance 
effectiveness and the need for an optimal sanctions system, from one side, and 
justice/proportional sanctions, from the other. The EU has opted for an administrative 
enforcement system in which increasingly high penalties are imposed following an 
inquisitorial process within the same administrative institution, the European Commission, 
which benefits from an important “policymaking” and “executing” discretion. Moreover, the 
judicial scrutiny exercised by the General Court, although unlimited in principle, falls short of 
                                                          
107 See e.g. Appl No 73053/01, Jussila v Finland, judgment of 23 November 2003, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=JUSSILA&sess
ionid=70158786&skin=hudoc-en, see especially para. 35–37 and 43–44. For commentary see e.g. Wils, 
W.J.P. (2011)  "EU antitrust enforcement powers and procedural rights and guarantees: the interplay 
between EU law, national law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention 
on Human Rights,” World Competition 34(2), 189-213. 
108 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, in Case C-295/12 P Telefónica SA, Telefónica de España SAU v. 
Commission [September 26, 2013], para. 109 (Judgment pending). 
109 Id., para. 123. 
110 Id., para. 129. 
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that performed in the context of a de novo review. The Court of Justice of the EU performs 
only a limited control of the judgments of the General Court for errors of law. This peculiar 
enforcement structure contrasts with the adversarial and prosecutorial model of 
enforcement that was chosen in Chile. Contrary to the European Commission, the FNE 
cannot impose any penalties but submits its request to an independent specialised tribunal, 
which has full jurisdiction to set the appropriate level of penalties, following an extensive 
adversarial process. The Tribunal exercises full scrutiny of the law and facts, as would a 
normal trial court judging in first instance would have done. The decision may be appealed 
to the Supreme Court which can scrutinize both errors of law and fact. The relatively low 
level of fines imposed by the TDLC (also in view of the low legislative threshold), and the 
primary role the judiciary plays in the enforcement of competition law in Chile, indicate that 
due process issues are not likely to arise in the foreseeable future111.    
 
2. The national level 
 
The new legal exception regime adopted by Regulation 1/2003 established a system where 
the burden of competition law enforcement is shared between the Commission and 
national competition authorities of EU Member States. National competition authorities act 
on their own initiative, or following a complaint, and have the power to require that the 
infringement is brought to an end, to order interim measures, to accept commitments, and 
to impose fines, periodic penalty payments, or any other penalty provided for in their 
national law112. The Member States are free to determine which body will enforce the EU 
competition law provisions and the procedure and mechanisms for investigations and for 
the enforcement of the decisions reached113. The Member States may allocate different 
powers and functions to those different national authorities, whether administrative or 
judicial.114. 
 
There is a considerable variety of institutional structures across the EU and although the 
trend is towards some degree of convergence with the EU administrative-centred model, 
Member States remain free to choose the institutional format for their national competition 
agencies, which could also be judicial organs. One could distinguish between  
 
                                                          
111 See Agüero, F. and Montt, S. (2013) “Chile: The Competition Law System and the Country’s Norms” in 
Fox, E. and Trebilcock, M. (eds.) The Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices, 
Oxford University Press, 149-193; Tapia, J. and Montt, S. (2012) “Judicial Scrutiny and Competition 
Authorities: The Institutional Limits of Antitrust”, in Lianos, I. and Sokol, D. (eds.) The Global Limits of 
Competition Law, Stanford University press, 141-157.  
112Article 5, Regulation 1/2003. 
113 Article 35, Regulation 1/2003. 
114Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, [2004] OJ C 101/43, 
para. 2. 
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(i) purely administrative enforcement model, which constitutes the dominant 
enforcement system in Europe. This sytem involves either a single independent 
administrative authority that conducts both the investigation and the 
adjudicatory function115, or an administrative enforcement system with a dual 
structure, where the investigation and adjudicatory functions are more or less 
separated from each other and exercised by different bodies within the same 
NCA. Most often this involves the adjudicatory function of a college of 
commissioners.116 The decisions can also be subject to some form of judicial 
control. 
 
(ii) mixed enforcement system model, where the investigation and adjudicatory 
functions are shared between the administration (a competition authority or a 
government department), which conducts the investigation, and a judicial organ 
(of an administrative117, civil118 or criminal119 nature), which exercises the 
adjudicative function.  
 
The decisions of the competition authorities are subject to judicial control120, either before 
courts, which can be a generalist court with exclusive competence to hear all competition 
appeals,121 or before a specialised tribunal in competition or economic litigation122. The 
                                                          
115 This is the institutional enforcement system chosen by Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, United Kingdom, Slovakia, 
Slovenia.  
116 This is the institutional enforcement system chosen by France, Luxembourg, Spain. One could also add to 
some degree Greece, Hungary, Romania and Italy where the final decision is taken by a college of 
commissioners, after the conduct of the investigation by the directions of the competition authority, but, 
contrary to France, Luxembourg and Spain, there is no complete separation between the two organs, as 
there is some form of hierarchical relationship between the college and the investigations teams of the 
authority. 
117 This is the institutional enforcement system chosen by Belgium (the investigation is conducted by the 
ministry of Economics, but the final decision is taken by the college of the Conseil de la concurrence which 
has the statute of an administrative judicial body) and Finland (where the Ministry of Economics conducts 
the investigation and the final decision is taken by the Kilpailuvirasto or Market tribunal – an administrative 
judicial organ). 
118 This is the institutional model chosen by Austria (where the federal ministry of economics conducts the 
investigation phase, the Federal cartel Attorney, “Bundeskartellanwalt”, is entrusted with the representation of 
the public interests in competition matters and brings proceedings to the Kartellgericht or Cartel court, which 
exercises the adjudicatory function) and Sweden  (the investigation being at the hands of the Konkurrenvertsket 
and the adjudicatory function being exercised by the Tribunal of Stockholm). 
119 This is the institutional model chosen by Denmark (where the Konkurrencestyrel or Ministry of economics is 
the investigating body but the final decision is taken by a criminal judge), Estonia (where the investigation 
is conducted by the Estonian Institute of competition, which is part of the Ministry of Economics, the final 
decision being taken by a criminal judge) and Ireland (where the investigation is conducted by the Irish 
Competition Authority, the final decision being taken by either the High Court – for civil court cases – or 
for hardcore restrictions by the Central Criminal Court, after the case has been presented to the Director of 
public prosecutions. The same system is also chosen by the UK, when enforcing the cartel offence under 
the Enterprise Act 2002 with the OFT investigating, the Serious Fraud Office acting as the prosecutor and 
the magistrates’ court (summary trial) or the Crown Court (trial on indictment) adjudicating. 
120 For a useful summary see, Roseau, M. (2007) “Panorama des procédures d’appel contre les décisions des 
ANC en Europe”, Concurrences 2, 209-218.  
121 See, for instance in Belgium (the Court of Appeal of Brussels for the decisions of the Conseil de la 
concurrence and the Council of State for Ministerial decisions in case of mergers), Bulgaria (the Supreme 
administrative court), Cyprus (the Supreme court), Czech Republic (Regional Court of Brno), France (the 
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judicial control might take different forms: it might be a limited judicial review of the legality 
of the decision,123 or involve a full jurisdictional (appeal) process124. An additional layer of 
judicial control of the review or appeal decisions may occur at a higher level of jurisdiction, 
which in some cases comprises a specialised chamber in competition litigation125. We will 
explore the judicial scrutiny exercised on the setting of penalties in some key EU 
jurisdictions. 
 
a. United Kingdom 
 
The remedies and penalties imposed by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), recently replaced 
by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), with regard to the application of Articles 
101, 102 and their national equivalents (Chapter I and II of the Competition Act 1998), are 
all subject to a full merits (appellate) review in front of a specialised Tribunal, the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)126. The process is close to a quasi-adversarial model, 
where the decisions of the OFT, or now the CMA, are subject to strict and intensive scrutiny 
in law, facts, and policy, the CAT having the authority to substitute its assessment to that of 
the CMA. The intensity of judicial control exercised over remedies and penalties is 
particularly strong, in comparison to the situation in the EU generally.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Court of Appeal of Paris), Estonia (The Administrative Court of Talin),  Germany (the judicial control of 
federal competition decisions takes place at the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf), Greece (the 
Administrative Appeal court of Athens), Latvia (the Administrative court of Riga), Hungary (the 
Metropolitan Tribunal of Budapest), Italy (the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio), Ireland (the High 
Court), Lithuania (the Administrative Court of Vilnius), Luxembourg (the Administrative Tribunal of 
Luxembourg), the Netherlands (the Court of Rotterdam), Portugal (the Commercial Court of Lisbon), 
Romania (the Court of appeal of Bucharest), Slovenia (the Administrative Court but only in specific 
circumstances as the decision of the NCA is final), Slovakia (the Regional Court of Appeal of Bratislava). 
122 See, for instance, Austria (Antitrust Court of Appeal), Denmark (Competition Court of appeal), Finland 
(Market Court), Spain (Defence of Competition Tribunal for the decisions of the Service for the protection 
of competition and the Audiencanacional for the decisions of the Defence of Competition Tribunal), 
Sweden (the Market Court for the decisions of the konkurrensverket and the Court of Stockholm for the 
decisions of the Market Court), Poland (Competition and Consumer Protection Court), UK (the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal). 
123 See, for instance, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,  
124 See, for instance, Belgium (with the exception of the ministerial decisions for mergers where the Council of 
State exercises a control of legality), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia Sweden, , UK (with the exception of merger decisions for which it is a 
judicial review), Portugal. 
125 See, for instance, in Germany (where the Federal Court of Justice comprises a specialised chamber in 
antitrust litigation) or in the Netherlands (the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal). 
126 The Tribunal was established by the Enterprise Act 2002 (Section 12 and Schedule 2). The CAT does not 
have inherent jurisdiction as the High Court (whose jurisdiction is established by precedent) but a statutory 
jurisdiction, its standards of review being based on statutory law. Section 46(1) and (2) of the Competition Act 
1998 provide that any party to an agreement in respect of which the OFT has made a decision, or any person in 
respect of whose conduct the OFT has made a decision, may appeal to the CAT ‘against, or with respect to, the 
decision’. Such decisions may also be made by the various sectoral regulators pursuant to the competition 
jurisdictions they hold concurrently with the OFT. Schedule 8 provides for two different types of review 
depending on the type of decision under appeal. In most cases, according to paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule, the 
CAT ‘must determine the appeal on the merits by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of 
appeal’. 
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In a full merits (appeal) review, the CAT proceeds to extensive findings of fact in cases where 
the evidence relied on by the CMA is challenged, very often on the basis of extensive new 
material introduced by the appellant, and rebuttal evidence introduced by the CMA127. 
However, the Tribunal exercises an appellate function and cannot proceed to the same 
analysis of the factual record as a court (or a regulator) would do in the first instance. The 
fact that it is an (appellate) review (and not a review de novo), limits to an extent the factual 
record submitted by the parties, and thus examined by the authority128. Hence, some 
weight will still be provided to the analysis performed by the relevant competition authority 
in the first instance129. As some commentators have explained, ‘when the decision under 
challenge is a multi-faceted policy decision, the CAT is more likely to allow the legitimate 
judgment of the regulator to stand, unless it can be shown that there is some error in the 
basis for that judgment’130. In contrast to judicial review or to the ordinary approach of an 
appellate court, the CAT is, however, willing in an appeal to determine disputes of primary 
fact, and proceeds more frequently than other appellate courts to cross-examination of 
witnesses131. This might seem, at first sight, to blur the distinction between an appeal 
process and an examination of the facts of the case at first instance. The appellate process 
certainly involves the rehearing of a case, but the content of such a rehearing is something 
that depends on a variety of factors. Writing in the context of an appeals process to the 
decision of a court at first instance, Mary L.J., noted that: 
The review will engage the merits of the appeal. It will accord appropriate respect to 
the decision of the lower court. Appropriate respect will be tempered by the nature 
of the lower court and its decision-making process. There will also be a spectrum of 
appropriate respect depending on the nature of the decision of the lower court 
which is challenged. At one end of the spectrum will be decisions of primary fact 
reached after an evaluation of oral evidence [,] where credibility is in issue 
[compared to] purely discretionary decisions. Further along the spectrum will be 
multi-factorial decisions often dependent on inferences and an analysis of 
documentary material.132 
Hence, re-hearing in an appeal does not amount to a rehearing ‘in the fullest sense of the 
word’, as the Court should ‘not normally interfere with the exercise of a discretion unless 
                                                          
127 M.E. Burgess, J.J. Burgess & S.J. Burgess v. OFT, [2005] CAT 25, para. 130. 
128 See, Freeserve v Director General of Telecommunications [2003] CAT 5, paras 110-111 ‘[…] in our view 
this Tribunal is essentially an appellate tribunal, not a tribunal of first instance. In complainants’ appeals (as 
distinct, for example, from appeals against penalties) it seems to us that the primary task of the Tribunal will 
usually be to decide whether, on the material put before him by the complainant, the Director was correct in 
arriving at the conclusion that he did. If it turns out, in the course of the appeal, that the Director was 
insufficiently informed, in our view the appropriate course will usually be for the Tribunal to remit, rather than 
to attempt to investigate the merits for the first time’. 
129  Albion Water Limited v Water Services Regulation Authority [2008] CAT 31, paras 70 & 72. 
130 Dinah Rose QC & Tom Richards, Appeal and Review in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and High Court, 
Blackstone Chambers, op. cit. p. 19. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Dupont de Nemours v Dupont [2003] EWCA Civ 1368, para. 94 cited by Dinah Rose QC & Tom Richards, 
Appeal and Review in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and High Court, Blackstone Chambers, op.cit. 
p.20. 
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the decision of the lower [authority] was reached on wrong principles or was otherwise 
plainly wrong’.133 Hence, ‘in so far as rehearing [...] may have something of a range of 
meaning at the lesser end of the range it merges with that of [judicial] ‘review’, as, ‘at this 
margin, attributing one label or the other is a semantic exercise which does not answer such 
questions of substance as arise in any appeal’134. As the CAT has clearly explained in M.E. 
Burgess, ‘(i)n deciding whether to take its own decision, the Tribunal is mindful of the fact 
that it is an appellate tribunal [reviewing] an administrative decision and should not 
therefore turn itself into the primary decision-maker without good reason’ 135. There is a 
perceptible tension between this principle and the fact that ‘the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is a 
merits jurisdiction, and thus wider than a judicial review jurisdiction’136. 
It follows that some margin of appreciation may also persist in the context of an appellate 
review process, depending on the exact position of the specific category of the decision in 
the ‘spectrum of appropriate respect,’ from which decision-makers benefit in the first 
instance. ‘Multi-factorial’ decisions or decisions ‘dependent on inferences and an analysis of 
documentary material’ (thus involving a wide margin of interpretative choices and 
important sources of information or methodological and epistemic competence), require in 
general more respect for the choices made by the competition authority than its decisions 
over primary facts.  
The CAT has examined the penalties imposed by the CMA on a number of occasions137. The 
CAT may impose, revoke, or vary the amount of the fines imposed. The Tribunal is not 
bound by the OFT/CMA Guidance on penalties138. However, it will not disregard either the 
Guidance or the CMA’s approach and reasoning in the specific case139. The Tribunal also 
takes into account the objectives pursued by the CMA’s policy on fines, as explained in the 
Guidance on penalties when examining their reasonableness or proportionality140, while 
affording the OFT (or the CMA) some margin of appreciation141. The latter concept is 
                                                          
133 Ibid., paras 96-97. 
134 Ibid., para. 98. 
135 M.E. Burgess, J.J. Burgess & S.J. Burgess v. OFT, [2005] CAT 25, para. 129. 
136 Floe Telecomm v Office of Communications [2005] CAT 14, para. 65, “It is our intention that the tribunal 
should be primarily concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions contained in the appealed 
decision and not with how the decision was reached or the reasoning expressed in it. That will apply unless 
defects in how the decision was reached or the reasoning make it impracticable for the tribunal fairly to 
determine the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions or of any directions contained in the decision. 
Wherever possible, we want the tribunal to decide a case on the facts before it, even where there has been a 
procedural error, and to avoid remitting the case to the [competition authority]’. 
137 See appendix 1, Lianos, I., Jenny, F., Wagner von Papp, F., Motchenkova E., David, E. et al (2014) An 
Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System for Infringements of Competition Law: a Comparative 
Analysis (CLES Research paper series 3/2014, UCL Faculty of Laws: London). 
138 Kier Group PLC & others v. OFT [2011] CAT 3, paras 74 & 77; Argos Limited and Littlewoods Limited and 
JJB Sports plc v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, para. 160. 
139 Kier Group PLC & others v. OFT [2011] CAT 3, para. 74. 
140 See the analysis performed in Eden Brown Limited v. OFT [2011] CAT 8, paras. 81-102 (e.g. para. 90). The 
policy objectives pursued by the OFT are listed in Section 1.4. of the OFT 423, Guidance as to the appropriate 
amount of a penalty (September 2012). 
141 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited v Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 1, para. 500; Argos 
Limited and Littlewoods Limited and JJB Sports plc v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318 ; Makers 
UK Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2007] CAT 11, para. 27.   
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interpreted differently than in the context of the “typical” judicial review, where it would 
“imply the presence of some restriction on the intensity of that review”142. The Tribunal has 
indeed held that its assessment “should focus primarily on whether the overall penalty 
imposed is appropriate for the infringements in question.” “[P]rovided that the OFT has 
remained within its margin of appreciation in applying the Guidance, the Tribunal’s primary 
task [will be] to assess the justice of the overall penalty, rather than to consider in minute 
detail the individual Steps applied by the OFT, particularly as regards Step 1 and Step 3”143. 
Reference to the “margin of appreciation” does not, according to the CAT, “in any way 
impede or diminish the Tribunal’s undoubted jurisdiction to reach its own independent view 
as to what is a just penalty in the light of all the relevant factors”144. The CAT will sanction 
any significant departure from the Guidance, although it also recognized that there is 
limited precedential value in decisions relating to penalties, “where the maxim that each 
case stands on its own facts is particularly pertinent”145. The “policymaking discretion” 
recognized by the OFT and the CMA in the interpretation and implementation of the 
Guidance may be illustrated by the following excerpt from Kier Group v. OFT: 
 
“The Guidance reflects the OFT’s chosen methodology for exercising its power to 
penalise infringements. It is expressed in relatively wide and non-specific language, 
which is open to interpretation, and which is clearly designed to leave the OFT 
sufficient flexibility to apply its provisions in many different situations. Provided the 
penalty ultimately arrived at is, in the Tribunal’s view, appropriate it will rarely serve 
much purpose to examine minutely the way in which the OFT interpreted and 
applied the Guidance at each specific step. As the Tribunal said in Argos (above), the 
Guidance allows scope for adjusting at later stages a penalty which viewed in 
isolation at an earlier, provisional, stage might appear too high or too low. 
 
On the other hand if […] the ultimate penalty appears to be excessive it will be 
important for the Tribunal to investigate and identify at which stage of the OFT’s 
process error has crept in. Assuming the Guidance itself is unimpugned […] the 
imposition of an excessive or unjust penalty is likely to reflect some misapplication or 
misinterpretation of the Guidance”146. 
 
In most instances, the CAT will first consider the implementation of the Guidance by the 
OFT/CMA, before proceeding to its own assessment of the level of the penalty on the basis 
of a “broad brush” approach taking the case as a whole, and refusing to adopt a 
“mechanistic approach”147. According to the Tribunal, the “determination of the penalty 
requires a refined consideration and assessment of all the relevant circumstances, and the 
                                                          
142 Kier Group PLC & others v. OFT [2011] CAT 3, para. 75. 
143 Argos Limited and Littlewoods Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 13, para. 172. 
144 Kier Group PLC & others v. OFT [2011] CAT 3, para. 76. 
145 Kier Group PLC & others v. OFT [2011] CAT 3, para. 116. 
146 Kier Group PLC & others v. OFT [2011] CAT 3, paras 76-77. 
147 See, for instance the assessment of the penalties in Eden Brown Limited v. OFT [2011] CAT 8, paras. 81-
102. 
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element of deterrence, while undoubtedly one of those circumstances, should not lead to 
the level of penalty being calculated according to a mathematical formula”148.  
 
Notwithstanding the consideration of the OFT Guidelines, the CAT seems to exercise a quite 
intensive review of the financial penalties imposed by the OFT/CMA (or sector-specific 
regulators concurrently implementing EU and UK competition law), Out of the 12 appeals 
against infringement decisions of the OFT since April 2001 and until the end of December 
2013, the CAT has reversed the decision of the OFT setting fines once, while it increased the 
fine in one occasion and decreased the fine in 10 appeals against the decisions imposing 
financial penalties. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Appeals at the Competition Appeal Tribunal against financial penalties 
 
Although the UK competition law enforcement system and, in particular, the judicial 
scrutiny phase has entered into an era of reform, the recent proposals by the Government 
on Streamlining Regulatory and Competition Appeals do not suggest any modification of the 
type and intensity of judicial scrutiny of penalties for infringement of competition law, 
although they suggest a move to a less intrusive judicial control for other types of 
decisions149. 
 
b. Germany150 
 
                                                          
148 Eden Brown Limited v. OFT [2011] CAT 8, para. 99 (also para. 100). 
149 HM Government, (2013) “Streamlining Regulatory and Competition Appeals. Consultation on Options for 
Reform” (19 June 2013). 
150 The following draws heavily on Wagner-von Papp, F. (2013) “Germany” in Denozza, F. and Toffoletto, A. 
(eds), International Encyclopedia of Laws: Competition Law, Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law 
International, paras 552-558. 
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In the fines procedure, the competition authority issues a fines decision (‘Bußgeldbescheid’), 
which states, in particular, the nature of the offence, time and place of the alleged 
infringement, the legal elements of the offence, the available evidence, the fine and other 
sanctions, and an explanation of the possibility for a court decision by raising an ‘objection’ 
(‘Einspruch’).151 
In our context, it is important to note from the outset that an objection to the fines decision 
(‘Einspruch’) does not merely lead to a judicial ‘review’ of the administrative fines decision. 
Instead, once the person concerned objects to the decision, the decision loses its 
independent, constitutive character, and from then on it has the status of a mere 
indictment without any prejudicial value. The Court conducts a full de novo trial. As the 
Court follows the quasi-criminal procedure, extensive evidence will be taken.152 
Nor is the court confined by the authority's decision with respect to the amount of the 
fine.153 Objecting to a fines decision may therefore eventually result in a higher fine than the 
one that had been imposed by the competition authority (so-called reformatio in peius, a 
possibility to which the person concerned has to be alerted in the fines decision, § 66(2) no. 
1(b) OWiG). While this may not have been a serious consideration in earlier times when the 
fines level was low,154 the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf has recently demonstrated that 
reformatio in peius can lead to a substantial increase; it increased the fines which the 
Bundeskartellamt had imposed on the members of the Liquid Gas Cartel from 
approximately €180 million to €244 million.155 
The objection against a fine decision by a competition authority is addressed to – and will in 
the first instance be reviewed by – this competition authority. The competition authority 
may reject the objection if it is inadmissible for procedural reasons (§ 69(1) OWiG). If it is 
admissible, the authority may take additional evidence and/or reconsider its decision (§ 
69(2) OWiG). If the authority stands by its fines decision, it decides on whether to grant 
access to the file (§ 49 OWiG, § 147 StPO). The authority then transfers the files to the 
public prosecutor's office, which at that instance becomes competent to initiate a public 
prosecution (§ 69(3), (4) OWiG). 
The public prosecutor has three options: it may take additional evidence, close the 
proceedings, or transfer the files to the court. In competition cases jurisdiction lies with the 
Higher Regional Court (OLG) in the district in which the competition authority has its seat (§ 
83 GWB); where it was the Bundeskartellamt that imposed the fine, the OLG Düsseldorf has 
                                                          
151 § 66 of the Act on Administrative Offences (Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, OWiG). 
152 See text accompanying note 158 below. 
153 In contrast, for example, to the Austrian system, where the court may not impose a higher fine than the 
competition authority proposes.  
154 See, for example, KG, 29 Apr. 1975, Kart. 38/74, WuW/E OLG 1627, 1632 – Mülltonnen, where the fine 
imposed by the Bundeskartellamt for a bid-rigging agreement was increased by 50% to ensure a deterrent 
sanction; the resulting fine of DM 15,000 still appears negligible by today's standards.  
155 OLG Düsseldorf, 15 Apr. 2013, VI-4 Kart 2-6/10 OWi – Liquid Gas Cartel: increase from EUR 180 million 
to EUR 244 million (available at www.nrwe.de; also cf. the press release in English issued by the 
Bundeskartellamt, at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2013/16_04_2013_Flüssigga
skartell-OLG.html) (appeal pending before the Bundesgerichtshof). 
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jurisdiction. Where the court considers the investigations ‘obviously insufficient’, it may 
send the files back. Otherwise, it decides on the procedural admissibility of the objection. 
Where the objection is admissible, the court may order the taking of further evidence. 
Under the statutory provisions (§ 72 OWiG), the court – with the approval of the prosecutor 
and the person(s) concerned – could theoretically decide on the merits of the case without a 
trial, based solely on written submissions. However, in complex competition cases, this will 
not usually be an option, and a trial will ensue. 
The prosecution during the trial lies in the hands of the public prosecutor. The competition 
authority has only a supportive role.156 The court has to inform the competition authority of 
the trial date and provides the competition authority with the opportunity to state aspects 
of the case that are in its view relevant (§ 76(1) OWiG), and the court ‘may’ give the 
authority's representative the opportunity to ask questions from the persons concerned, 
including calling witnesses and expert witnesses (§ 82a(1) GWB). For actions for which the 
court requires the prosecution's approval, the court needs to consult the competition 
authority; however, where the public prosecutor approves while the competition authority 
objects, it is the public prosecutor that prevails. 
While the procedural rules for trials in administrative fines matters largely follow the rules 
for criminal trials, there are a number of accommodations of the strict standards applied in 
criminal trials. It should be noted that this is mostly because administrative offences usually 
deal with minor matters and concern low fines, such as minor traffic infractions. Compared 
to the nature and gravity of other administrative offences, it is an abnormality that 
competition law infringements, with its huge fines, are classified as administrative and not 
criminal offences. Nevertheless, the courts do apply the relaxed rules of procedure even to 
complex cases where fines in the amount of several million of euros are concerned. One of 
the most important relaxations of the stringency of criminal trials is § 77 OWiG, which 
allows the court substantial flexibility with regard to the extent to which it allows evidence 
to be introduced in trials on administrative offences. In particular, the court may reject 
applications for taking evidence where it is persuaded that the evidence before the court 
has already revealed the truth. While such shortcuts are arguably an efficient way of 
disposing of minor run-of-the-mill administrative offence cases (such as traffic offences), the 
courts' discretion when deciding on multi-million euro fines on undertakings, or hundreds of 
thousands of euro fines on individuals, is problematic.157 The courts relatively frequent use 
of § 77 OWiG in competition cases is particularly problematic in view of the statutory 
admonition that the courts should take account of the ‘importance of the matter before it’ 
when exercising its discretion concerning the extent of the introduction of evidence (§ 
77(1)2 OWiG). 
Despite these relaxations, the quasi-criminal procedure guarantees a full and cumbersome 
taking of evidence. Konrad Ost, the Bundeskartellamt’s Director for General Policy, has 
                                                          
156 This has been repeatedly criticized, and the 7th Amendment to the GWB was meant to hand the prosecution 
to the competition authority, before the plans were thwarted by the German Justice Department. 
157 See generally Dannecker, G. and Biermann, J. (2007) in Immenga, U. and Mestmäcker, E.-J. (eds) GWB 
Kommentar, 4th edn., Munich: C.H. Beck. Vorbemerkung vor § 81 para. 192. 
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recently noted that a medium-sized cartel, such as the Paper Wholesalers cartel, took 20 
days in court; the Cement Cartel 37 days in court;, and the Liquid Gas Cartel 100 days in 
court over a total duration of three years.158 
 
c. France 
 
Decisions of the FCA can be challenged before the Paris Court of appeal (hereafter, the 
“Court”)159. According to Article L. 464-8 of the French Commercial Code, the Court 
exercises full control on the law and the facts. When the Court annuls a decision of the FCA, 
the Court may issue a full judgment imposing a fine, rather than the case coming back 
before the FCA in order for it to adopt a new decision160. 
 
Decisions of the Court have no erga omnes effect. Therefore, the sanctioned undertakings 
which did not challenge the decision of the FCA do not benefit from any eventual annulation 
of this decision in favor of other undertakings161. 
 
The Court can reduce, confirm or increase162 the fines imposed by the FCA. The Court can 
also impose fines to a non-fined undertaking should the procedure before the Court provide 
sufficient evidence for doing so163. Nevertheless, the scope of the decision of the FCA may 
put a limit on the scope of the judicial scrutiny exercised by the Court. Therefore, for 
instance, when a decision rejecting a complaint is challenged, the Court cannot impose a 
fine on the undertaking, but the FCA still must take the case164. Except a few decisions165, it 
is well established that the Court cannot decide ultra petita. Therefore, the Court cannot 
increase a fine without a prior and reasoned request (generally from the Minister of the 
Economy)166. 
 
In contrast with the EU jurisprudence167, the Court controls if a fine was justified in 
principle168. The Court makes its own assessment of the proportionality of the fines imposed 
by the FCA. The most frequent reason to reduce the fines has been the financial and 
                                                          
158 Ost, K. (2014) “From Regulation 1 to Regulation 2: National Enforcement of EU Cartel Prohibition and the 
Need for Further Convergence”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 5(3), 125, 129.  
159 Decisions of the Court can be challenged before the Supreme Court (Cour de cassation). 
160 Supreme Court, 13th July, 2004 (challenging Paris Court of appeal, 14th January, 2003). 
161 Paris Court of appeal, 13th December1995 (challenging Decision N°94-D-60 of 13th December, 1994). 
162 See Paris Court of appeal, 19th May 1988 (challenging Decision N°87-D-54) and 2nd April 1996 (challenging 
Decision N°95-D-23 of 14th March, 1995 and confirmed by the Supreme Court, 24th March, 1998). 
163 See, for instance, Paris Court of appeal, 14th November 2000 (challenging Decision N°2000-D-24 of 10th 
May, 2000). 
164 Paris Court of appeal, 14th November 2000 (challenging Decision N°2000-D-24 of 10th May 2000). 
165 Paris Court of appeal, 28th May 1996 (challenging Decision N°95-D-56 of 12th September 1995). 
166 Paris Court of appeal, 21st January, 1993 (challenging Decision N°92-D-33of 6th May 1992) ; 25th February, 
1994 (challenging Decision N°93-D-14 of 18 May 1993) ; 2nd April 1996 (challenging Decision N°95-D-23 
of 14th March 1995) ; 13th December, 2001 (challenging Decision N°2000-D-39 of 24th January 2001). 
167 See General Court, Case T-62/98, 6th July, 2000, Volkswagen AG v. Commission CE, esp. §335. 
168 Paris Court of appeal, 20th April 1989 (challenging Decision N°88-D-39) ; 10th December 1992 (challenging 
Decision N°92-D-20 of 17th March, 1992). 
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economic difficulties faced by the fined entity. In a very famous case (the Steel cartel case), 
the Paris Court of appeal has substantially reduced the fines imposed by the FCA (the total 
amount of the fines was €575 million; the amount of the reduction has been up to 90% for 
some undertakings)169. This judgment has been influential in the decision of the FCA to 
adopt its sentencing guidelines (hereafter, “SG”) in May 2011.  
 
To the time of writing, the Court has ruled four times on decisions where the SG was applied 
by the FCA and each time has confirmed the decisions of the FCA. 
  
According to the Court170, the SG complies with the legal framework (Article L. 442-6 of the 
French Commercial Code). The Court has ruled that, thanks to the SG, the FCA has described 
and explained its method of setting the amount of the fines imposed on entities. The Court 
has ruled that the SG has no normative value, since it must be considered as a guidance 
statement (administrative directive)171. The Court controls if the FCA has correctly applied 
the criteria set out in Article L. 442-6 of the French Commercial Code (seriousness of the 
practices, damages caused to the Economy, personal situation of each fined entity and 
reiteration). 
Since the decisions rendered by the FCA are more reasoned, the ability for the Court to have 
its own assessment of the facts is limited. Therefore, the Court controls if the FCA has failed 
or erred in its assessment of the elements contained in the file. The Court has ruled that an 
appellant cannot refer to prior decisions or jurisprudence in order to argue a violation of the 
principle of equality of treatment, since this assessment must be done on a case by case 
basis172. What may appear more contestable is that the Court has also ruled that an 
undertaking cannot invoke as well the treatment of another party to the same procedure 
under the same reasoning173. 
We can suppose that the Court should increase its control on the assessment of the facts by 
the FCA. Nevertheless, because of the SG, the decisions rendered by the FCA are more 
reasoned (this is a confirmed tendency since the middle of the 2000’s). Therefore, the Court 
is more reluctant to revise the reasoning of the FCA and the amount of the fines.  
 
3. United States 
 
We will focus here on the judicial scrutiny exercised by an appellate court to a sentencing 
judge, in view of the prosecutorial nature of the US enforcement system. The degree of 
deference an appellate court owes to a sentencing judge is still unclear in US law. Normally, 
as the Supreme Court explained in Booker the “statutory language, the structure of the 
                                                          
169 Paris Court of appeal, 19th January, 2010, (challenging decision N°08-D-32 of 16th December, 2008). 
170 Paris Court of appeal, 30th January, 2014 (challenging decision N°11-D-17 of 8th December, 2011) and 10th 
October, 2013, (challenging decision N°12-D-10 of 20th March, 2012). 
171 Paris Court of appeal, 30th January, 2014 (challenging decision N°11-D-17 of 8th December, 2011). 
172 Paris Court of appeal, 10th October, 2013, (challenging decision N°12-D-10 of 20th March, 2012). 
173 Paris Court of appeal, 10th October, 2013, (challenging decision N°12-D-10 of 20th March, 2012). 
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Sentencing Reform Act, and the sound administration of justice, taken together, require 
appellate courts to apply “reasonableness standard(s) of review”174. In Kimbrough175, 
Spears176 and Pepper177, the Supreme Court held however that a sentencing judge’s 
sentencing determination may be subject to a more intensive judicial scrutiny, close to that 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (the “arbitrary and capricious review”) if the 
sentencing judge imposes a sentence that varies from the Guidelines on the basis of a policy 
disagreement178. In view of the institutional characteristics of the Sentencing Commission, 
which has capabilities to collect and analyze empirical data and national experience, the 
Supreme Court felt that although the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, in “light of the 
“discrete institutional strengths” of the Sentencing Commission and sentencing judges”, 
they should be offered some degree of respect179. According to Justice Breyer (concurring 
opinion) in Pepper: 
“(t)he trial court typically better understands the individual circumstances of 
particular cases before it, while the Commission has comparatively greater ability to 
gather information, to consider a broader national picture, to compare sentences 
attaching to different offenses, and ultimately to write more coherent overall 
standards that reflect nationally uniform, not simply local, sentencing policies”180. 
Hence, a “sliding scale” framework of review requires appellate courts to subject sentencing 
judges’ decisions to a more intensive review, when they rest upon a disagreement with the 
policy followed by the Guidelines; Judges are also offered “greater deference” when their 
determination is based on “case-specific factors”181. Indeed, appellate courts should review 
those decisions with greater deference when they rest upon case-specific circumstances 
that place the case outside a specific Guideline’s ‘heartland”182. 
 
                                                          
174 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-261 (2005). 
175 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, (2007). 
176 Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009). 
177 Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, (2011). 
178 Cases discussed by Thide, F. (2013) “Judicial Policy Nullification of the antitrust Sentencing Guideline”, 
Boston College Law Review 54(2), 861, 878-879, 901. 
179 Thide, F. (2013) “Judicial Policy Nullification of the antitrust Sentencing Guideline”, Boston College Law 
Review 54(2), 861, 879. 
180 Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1253-1254 (2011) (Breyer J., concurring). 
181 Thide, F. (2013) “Judicial Policy Nullification of the antitrust Sentencing Guideline”, Boston College Law 
Review 54(2), 861, 879. 
182 See also, Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338, 351 (2007). 
